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REDISCOVERING OYAMA V. CALIFORNIA:  
AT THE INTERSECTION OF PROPERTY,  
RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP 
ROSE CUISON VILLAZOR

 
ABSTRACT 
 
Oyama v. California was a landmark case in the history of civil rights. 
Decided in January 1948, Oyama held unconstitutional a provision of 
California‘s Alien Land Law, which allowed the state to take an escheat 
action on property given to U.S. citizens that had been purchased by their 
parents who were not eligible to become citizens. At the time, the 
country‘s naturalization law prohibited Japanese nationals from becoming 
U.S. citizens. Thus, the Alien Land Law applied primarily to Japanese 
nationals and Japanese Americans. Critically, the Supreme Court in 
Oyama recognized that the state‘s attempted taking of a citizen‘s property 
because his father was Japanese constituted a violation of his equal 
protection rights.  In so doing, Oyama created a paradigm shift in the 
treatment of property rights of Japanese Americans.  
Despite its significance, Oyama has received surprisingly little 
attention in legal scholarship. Leading constitutional and property law 
casebooks have virtually ignored the case. This Article seeks to correct 
that oversight. As this Article argues, Oyama fills a neglected void in our 
collective historical understanding of race, property law, and citizenship. 
Equally important, it provides a timely normative and prescriptive 
response to contentious contemporary debates about the validity of state 
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and local law restrictions on leaseholds against a select group of 
noncitizens, namely undocumented immigrants. By calling attention to the 
historical and contemporary contributions of this largely unnoticed case, 
this Article argues why Oyama should be included in the canons of 
property and constitutional laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I was aware that my rights were being violated but if that‘s what the 
President wanted us to do—then we must evacuated [sic]. It was my 
intention to prove my loyalty and looked forward to joining the 
service. That is—until the property was escheated. My desire to join 
the service was to defend my country and, more specifically, to 
defend my home. When they took our home, I changed my attitude 
completely. I could never be hostile to the U.S.A.—but I was bitterly 
disappointed and felt like a man without a country. 
—Fred Yoshihiro Oyama.1 
Today, two seemingly disparate areas of law—property and 
immigration—are colliding. In the past several years, a number of 
municipalities have enacted local ordinances that prohibit the ability of 
undocumented immigrants
2
 to enter into a residential lease in an apartment 
or residential building located within their borders.
3
 Among these is the 
City of Farmers Branch‘s Ordinance 2952 (―Ordinance 2952‖), which 
required all persons to declare that they are U.S. citizens or nationals or 
provide an identification number that establishes ―lawful presence‖ in the 
United States in order to obtain a residential occupancy license before 
signing an apartment or other residential lease.
4
 Stating that ―persons who 
 
 
 1. Letter from Fred Oyama to Rose Cuison Villazor (July 30, 2008) (on file with Washington 
University Law Review) (Response to Question No. 6, ―How did you feel about [the executive order 
that mandated the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast]? How did you 
feel about leaving your home?‖).  
 2. This Article uses the phrase ―unauthorized immigrants,‖ ―unauthorized noncitizens,‖ 
―undocumented immigrants,‖ and ―undocumented noncitizens‖ interchangeably instead of the 
pejorative term ―illegal alien‖ to refer to the population of immigrants who do not have valid 
immigration status in the United States. See Kevin R. Johnson, ―Aliens‖ and the U.S. Immigration 
Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 276 
(1997) (―The most damning terminology for noncitizens is ‗illegal alien‘ . . . Illegal aliens is a 
pejorative term that implies criminality, thereby suggesting that the persons who fall in this category 
deserve punishment, not legal protection.‖) (citation omitted). 
 3. See, e.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952, § 1(B)(5) (Jan. 22, 2008) (limiting the 
right to obtain a license to lease a residence to U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, or those who can show 
evidence of ―lawful presence in the United States‖); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2903, 
§ 3(2) (May 22, 2007) (requiring each member of a tenant family to submit evidence of ―citizenship or 
eligible immigration status‖ prior to entering a lease); Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16, § 5 (July 
27, 2006) (prohibiting renting property to ―illegal aliens‖); Escondido, Cal., Ordinance No. 2006-38 R, 
§ 16E-1 (Oct. 10, 2006) (proscribing ―harboring [of] illegal aliens‖); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-
40, § 7 (Dec. 13, 2006) (same); County of Cherokee, Ga., Ordinance No. 2006-003, § 18-503 (Dec. 5, 
2006) (same). 
 4. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952, § 1(B)(5)(i). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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are not lawfully present in the United States‖ are not eligible for certain 
state and local benefits including residential licenses,
5
 Ordinance 2952 
created a licensing scheme that required the city to verify a person‘s lawful 
immigration status with the federal government before that person could 
live within the city.
6
 
The attempts of Ordinance 2952 and similar local restrictive housing 
laws that use unauthorized immigration status to deny the ability of 
undocumented noncitizens to rent property have expectedly invited 
contentious litigation.
7
 Central in these lawsuits is the question of whether 
 
 
 5. Id. pmbl. (―WHEREAS, pursuant to Title 8, United States Code Sections 1621, et seq., 
certain aliens not lawfully present in the United States are not eligible for certain State or local public 
benefits, including licenses . . . .‖); id. § 1(B)(1) (―Prior to occupying any leased or rented single-
family residence, each occupant must obtain a residential occupancy license.‖). 
 6. Id. § 1(D) (explaining the procedures that the city‘s building inspector must follow to verify 
whether a tenant who failed to declare his or her citizenship is ―an alien lawfully present in the United 
States‖).  
 7. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:08-CV-1551-B, 3:03-
CV-1615, 2010 WL 1141398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010) (Villas II) (lawsuit involving validity of 
Farmers Branch Ordinance 2952); Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 85 
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (lawsuit regarding validity of Ordinance 2903). On a broader scale, these local 
restrictive housing laws are part of larger state and local efforts to curb illegal immigration within their 
borders. By passing these laws, some sub-federal governments seek to challenge the long-held 
principle that the federal government has exclusive authority to regulate immigration law. See Cristina 
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 570 
(2008) (―[T]he trend in state and local immigration regulation in the twenty-first century . . . [is] in 
significant tension with a doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century—
that immigration control is the exclusive responsibility of the federal government . . . .‖). The 
challenges to the federal exclusivity principle in immigration law have manifested in different forms. 
On the one hand are laws that rely on inherent state and local government police powers to exclude 
undocumented immigrants and, in so doing, aim to bolster the federal government‘s enforcement 
goals. See, e.g., Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952 (―[I]t is the intent of the City of Farmers 
Branch to enact regulations that are harmonious with federal immigration law and which aid in its 
enforcement . . . .‖); Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211–23-216 (2003) 
(prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers by relying on the federal immigration 
law‘s definition ―unauthorized aliens‖); Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, 2007 
Okla. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. 112 § 2 (West) (proscribing employers from hiring undocumented workers 
because their continued employment ―impede[s] and obstruct[s] the enforcement of federal 
immigration law‖ and thus, the law seeks to discourage ―illegal immigration‖). Despite their stated 
consistency with federal law, these laws have been subject to preemption challenges. Compare 
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that provisions 
of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 that imposed sanctions on employers 
who employ unauthorized noncitizens are preempted) and Villas II, 2010 WL 1141398 (holding that 
federal law preempts Farmers Branch Ordinance 2952) with Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Arizona‘s law that allowed for the 
revocation of business licenses by employers who hired undocumented workers was not preempted by 
federal law). See also Fonseca v. Fong, 84 Cal. App. Rptr. 3d 567 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding 
state law requiring city police officers to notify the federal government when they have custody of a 
noncitizen suspected of violating drug laws). On the other hand are laws, also grounded on state and 
local government authority and autonomy, which seek to be more inclusive of undocumented 
immigrants. These types of laws have also been subjected to preemption lawsuits. Compare City of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/2
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the local laws are unlawfully regulating immigration law, which has long 
been held to fall under the exclusive domain of the federal government,
8
 or 
whether the laws are regulating property and housing, which are areas that 
traditionally fall within the domain of state and local governments.
9
 The 
lawsuits have also focused on the civil rights implications of the laws. 
Invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
10
 
plaintiffs have argued that the laws discriminate on the basis of race or 
national origin.
11
 A number of scholars agree, commenting that many of 
these laws are problematic because they are directed primarily against 
Latina/os.
12
 Indeed, evidencing fears of the ―Browning‖ of their towns,13 
political leaders and supporters favoring these local housing restrictions 
have indicated their intent to exclude Latina/os from their neighborhoods 
regardless of their immigration status.
14
 That is, although designed to limit 
 
 
New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that New York City‘s noncooperation 
policy of not reporting the immigration status of individuals to federal officials was preempted) and 
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that state law that 
provided in-state tuition for undocumented college students was not preempted).  
 8. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (―The power of exclusion of 
foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part 
of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in 
the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or 
restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, 
and are incapable of transfer to any other parties.‖); Rodríguez, supra note 7, at 570 (discussing the 
federal exclusivity principle in immigration law). 
 9. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (discussing traditional 
police powers of states to regulate property); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 
(1984) (noting that regulation of property falls within the traditional police powers of states); D. 
Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 476–78 (2004) 
(explaining that state and local governments enact property laws under their police powers).  
 10. U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1. 
 11. See, e.g., Complaint at 18, Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:08-cv-01615-O (N.D. 
Tex. Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://maldef.org/assets/pdf/ordinance2952_complaint091208.pdf 
(challenging the constitutionality of Farmers Branch Ordinance 2952 on the grounds that it violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the law had the ―purpose and intent to 
discriminate against Latinos on the basis of race and national origin‖). 
 12. See Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! ―Illegal‖ Immigrants Beware: Local 
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 
9–11 (2007) (noting that the Hazleton ordinance targeted Latino immigrants); Huyen Pham, When 
Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1126–27 (2009) (discussing that anti-immigrant 
ordinances have been passed in places that have experienced increased Latino migration); Tom I. 
Romero, II, No Brown Towns: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances and Equality of Educational Opportunity 
for Latina/os, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 13, 23 (2008) (―At the heart of many of the anti-
immigration ordinances and related legislation is an attempt to control and concentrate the movement 
of specifically the Latino community, regardless of citizenship status.‖); Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing 
Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 80–81 (2009) (explaining that anti-illegal immigrant ordinances 
are shown to be anti-Mexican). 
 13. See Oliveri, supra note 12, at 80–81; Romero, supra note 12, at 23–24.  
 14. See infra Part III (discussing legislative history of Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903 and 
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undocumented noncitizens‘ right to property, the laws have the 
consequence of affecting the property rights of U.S. citizens as well.  
Although fairly novel in recent memory, the intersection of property, 
race, immigration, and citizenship that these local ordinances reflect is far 
from new. In particular, the current discussion of these local housing 
ordinances has overlooked the ways in which these laws parallel alien land 
laws that states passed in the early twentieth century. These alien land 
laws, which prohibited noncitizens who were statutorily ineligible to apply 
for U.S. citizenship to own or lease property,
15
 primarily targeted 
Japanese. In 1923, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of these laws on 
the grounds that states traditionally have authority to regulate the property 
rights of noncitizens.
16
  
Ultimately, these state property laws succumbed to equality principles 
in Oyama v. California
17
 when the Supreme Court struck down the 
application of California‘s Alien Land Law to U.S. citizens. As the Court 
noted, California‘s Alien Land Law did more than deny noncitizens who 
were not eligible to become citizens from owning land. The law also 
restricted the rights of U.S. citizens to own property if their noncitizen 
parents purchased the land on their behalf.
18
 Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the law as applied to Fred Oyama, a Japanese American, 
concluding that by denying him his right to own property because of his 
father‘s national origin, the state violated his right to equal protection and 
―privileges as an American citizen.‖19  
This Article explores the interplay between property, race, and 
citizenship in Oyama and analyzes the case‘s historical, doctrinal, and 
theoretical contributions to the canons of property and constitutional 
laws.
20
 Overall, the Article has two broad aims. Its primary goal is to fill a 
 
 
Ordinance 2952 indicating racialized purposes of the law). 
 15. See infra Part I (discussing the passage of alien land laws). 
 16. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222 (1923) (affirming Washington‘s alien land law); 
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding California‘s alien land law); Webb v. 
O‘Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 322–24 (1923) (affirming California‘s alien land law); Frick v. Webb, 263 
U.S. 326, 333–34 (1923) (affirming California‘s alien land law). 
 17. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
 18. See infra Part I (explaining the racialized purpose of the alien land laws against Japanese). 
 19. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 640. 
 20. This Article is part of a larger project of exploring how cases and laws that have been 
overlooked in property and immigration legal scholarship shed new light on our understanding of the 
legal construction of race and citizenship. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws 
and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801 (2008) (analyzing federal cases 
that upheld blood quantum land alienation restrictions in the U.S. territories and exploring their 
broader implications on the legal construction of race and political indigeneity); Rose Cuison Villazor, 
Reading Between the (Blood) Lines, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 473 (forthcoming 2010) (exploring linkages 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] REDISCOVERING OYAMA V. CALIFORNIA 985 
 
 
 
 
gap in the historical narrative of property rights by highlighting how this 
largely unnoticed case deepens, as this Article argues, our understanding 
of property and equal protection. Secondarily, the Article seeks to link this 
overlooked history to contemporary housing restrictions against 
undocumented immigrants.  
Oyama was a landmark case in the history of equal protection and 
property rights in the United States.
21
 Decided four years after Korematsu 
v. United States,
22
 which upheld the constitutionality of E.O. 9066,
23
 
Oyama helped to turn the tide against ongoing public discrimination 
directed at the recently interned Japanese families. Specifically, although 
California enacted the Alien Land Law in the early 1900s, it did not 
significantly enforce it until well into the internment of Japanese and after 
their release from concentration camps.
24
 This more vigorous enforcement 
of the law demonstrated the state‘s ongoing quest to expel Japanese from 
California through the use of a state property law. Thus, Oyama‘s 
protection of a Japanese American‘s right to own property returned some 
measure of security against California‘s relentless efforts to exclude the 
Japanese community. Regrettably, Oyama did not address the question of 
 
 
between blood quantum, race, property rights, and sovereignty in legal efforts to address the effects of 
racial subordination and colonial subjugation of indigenous peoples and considering import of 
territorial cases and laws in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands on larger efforts to 
promote indigenous peoples‘ right to self-determination) (on file with Washington University Law 
Review); Rose Cuison Villazor, Racially Inadmissible Wives: Uncovering Immigration Law‘s 
Restrictions on Interracial Marriages (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (examining how 
the convergence of immigration law, the War Brides Act, and military regulations functioned like the 
federal counterpart of state antimiscegenation laws by restricting the ability of U.S. citizen soldiers to 
marry Japanese women during post-World War II period and the implications of their intersections on 
the meaning of citizenship). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
 23. See id. at 217–18. Korematsu is considered one of the worst Supreme Court opinions in the 
history of constitutional jurisprudence. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST 
AND WORST IN AMERICAN LAW WITH 100 COURT AND JUDGE TRIVIA QUESTIONS 69 (1997); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency Powers: The United States‘ 
Constitutional Approach to Rights during Wartime, 2 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 296, 311 (2004) (―Korematsu 
is excoriated as one of the two or three worst moments in American constitutional history.‖). The 
evacuation ultimately led to the internment of more than 20,000 Japanese. See GREG ROBINSON, BY 
ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS 4 (2001); FRANK F. 
CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LAW AND JAPANESE-AMERICANS 161–63 (1976). 
 24. See infra Parts I and II and accompanying notes (explaining the enforcement of the Alien 
Land Law). As Keith Aoki eloquently explained, the enactment of the alien land laws in the early 
1900s directly related to the internment of Japanese. See Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early 
Twentieth-Century ―Alien Land Laws‖ as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37, 68 (1998) 
(―The Alien Land Laws allowed, promoted and indeed encouraged a linkage between race, nationality 
and denial of civil rights that culminated in the internment of Japanese Americans. Accordingly, the 
denial of civil rights to Asian immigrants ‗ineligible for citizenship‘ under Alien Land Laws paved the 
way for the denial of civil rights to Japanese-American citizens . . . .‖). 
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whether the Alien Land Law violated the equal rights of noncitizen 
Japanese. In so doing, it left open the authority of state and local 
governments to continue to use their police powers to regulate 
noncitizens‘ access to property.25 Nevertheless, Oyama stalled the state‘s 
continued discrimination against Japanese landholding.
26
 Importantly, it 
provided support for the striking down of California‘s Alien Land Law a 
few years later.
27
  
More broadly, by recognizing the racialized effect of the Alien Land 
Law‘s differential treatment against U.S. citizen children of Japanese 
nationals, Oyama paved an important path towards fulfilling the promise 
of equality in property ownership that the Supreme Court later enshrined 
in Shelley v. Kraemer.
28
 Indeed, Shelley, which was decided four months 
after Oyama by the same set of Supreme Court justices and also authored 
by Chief Justice Vinson, relied on Oyama for the proposition that the 
denial of equal enjoyment of property rights by a state on the basis of a 
person‘s race and ancestry constituted an equal protection violation.29  
Unlike Korematsu and Shelley, Oyama‘s place within equal protection 
jurisprudence has been overlooked in pedagogical and scholarly 
literature.
30
 For example, leading constitutional law and property law 
 
 
 25. See infra Part III (explaining that state and local governments may continue to regulate 
noncitizens‘ access to property as long as they do not discriminate based on race). Whether state and 
local government regulation of noncitizens‘ property rights constitute unlawful immigration 
regulation, however, is an entirely different issue than is preliminarily explored infra. A full analysis 
of determining the appropriate balance between federal immigration law and local property regulation 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 26. Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 577 (Or. 1949) (stating that Oyama v. California ―in fact, 
ended the Alien Land Law‖); Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection of the Laws: Presumption of 
Intent to Evade Escheat in California Alien Land Law, 36 CAL. L. REV. 320, 324 (1948) (―The 
Attorney General of California has interpreted [Oyama] as ending the practical utility of the alien land 
law, and has indicated his intention to dismiss all the escheat cases pending before the California 
courts.‖).  
 27. Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (relying on Oyama v. California to invalidate 
the Alien Land Law). 
 28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of private racial covenants would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 29. See id. at 21 (citing Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)). 
 30. There are notable exceptions. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 24, at 52–64; Gabriel J. Chin, 
Citizenship and Exclusion: Wyoming‘s Anti-Japanese Alien Land Law in Context, 1 WYO. L. REV. 
497, 500–09 (2001); Brant T. Lee, A Racial Trust: The Japanese YWCA and the Alien Land Law, 7 
ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 18–20 (2001); Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: 
Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 32–39 
(2005); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, ―Foreignness,‖ and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (1997). These articles, however, did not 
conduct an extensive analysis of Oyama and its overall place within property and equal protection 
jurisprudence. As this Article argues, greater attention should be given to Oyama itself because of its 
unique contributions to our understanding of property, race, and citizenship. Other scholars have 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/2
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casebooks include both Korematsu and Shelley but do not even refer to 
Oyama.
31
 This Article intends to correct this oversight. As this Article 
contends, Oyama has much to offer our collective knowledge of equal 
protection, property, immigration, and citizenship jurisprudence.  
First, Oyama constitutes an important piece of the larger story of non-
whites‘ struggle for equal access to property in the early to mid-1900s. 
The conventional understanding of discrimination in property law is that 
racial barriers to property rights resulted in unequal citizenship. Both 
Shelley and Buchanan tell this dynamic of using equality principles in 
order to vindicate the equal citizenship rights of African Americans.
32
 
 
 
recently conducted deeper analyses of cases that have been marginalized in the scholarly literature that 
also revealed underappreciated conceptions of race, citizenship, and civil rights. See, e.g., Devon W. 
Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 633 (2009) (examining Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 
178 (1922)); Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 505 (2006) (analyzing cases where white neighbors used nuisance doctrine to maintain 
residential segregation); Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the 
History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999 (2008) (examining Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) and the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in private 
discrimination of sale of property). 
 31. For constitutional law books that fail to include, refer, or cite Oyama, see RANDY E. 
BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT (2008); PAUL BREST ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING (5th ed. 2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (16th ed. 2007). But see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1315–16 (3d ed. 2000) (mentioning Oyama). 
The leading property casebook, JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006), similarly does 
not include Oyama. But see JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES 20 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing Oyama in the notes). I note here that casebooks on race and 
the law do include Oyama. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR 
A DIVERSE AMERICA 429 (2d ed. 2007); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 102 
(5th ed. 2004). As I argue in this Article, however, Oyama should also be covered in ―mainstream‖ 
pedagogical literature.  
 32. Told in this way, the relationship between property, race, and citizenship is explored from a 
mainly Black/White lens. See Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The ―Normal 
Science‖ of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1997). This Article does not claim 
that discussions of race should not begin with an examination of how law constructed race along a 
Black/White binary construction. As Neil Gotanda explained, the ―American racial classification 
practice has included a particular rule for defining the categories black and white.‖ Neil Gotanda, A 
Critique of ―Our Constitution is Color-Blind,‖ in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257, 258 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). But as Juan Perea has 
cautioned, the Black/White paradigm leads to the marginalization of concerns of other people of color. 
See Perea, supra, at 1215. To be sure, much about the meaning and criticism of the Black/White 
paradigm still needs to be unpacked. This Article‘s exploration of Oyama and the alien land laws seeks 
to be part of that larger conversation about the need to examine the ways in which the construction of 
race and racial subordination affected different groups. Notably, the Article underscores Bob Chang‘s 
call for further examination of the racialization of Asian Americans. See Robert S. Chang, Toward An 
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 
81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1265 (1993) (pointing out the need to include the varied experiences of Asian 
Americans with discrimination within the larger discourse of race and the law); see also Carbado, 
supra note 30, at 636 (noting law‘s role in constructing Asians as a racial group). 
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Oyama reveals a different, yet equally compelling, story of the 
relationship between property, race, and citizenship. Specifically, Oyama 
reconfigures the dynamic by illustrating how the Alien Land Law 
deployed citizenship to deny individuals, specifically Japanese, the right to 
own property. As Oyama acknowledged, racial equality ultimately proved 
to be the sword that cut through the subordination of persons through the 
use of racialized citizenship laws. Accordingly, examining Oyama and the 
dismantling of barriers to property faced by Japanese—resident aliens and 
U.S. citizens alike—thus expands our overall conception of the 
intersection between race, property ownership, and equal citizenship.  
Second, Oyama facilitates revisiting the disjunction between 
citizenship and noncitizenship in land ownership and the broader 
limitations on state authority over the property rights of noncitizens. 
Although Oyama dictated that states might no longer enact laws that 
discriminated against citizens on the basis of race, it left unresolved the 
question of the extent to which states may restrict the ability of noncitizens 
to acquire a property interest. By evading this question in Oyama, the 
Supreme Court let stand its earlier opinions, which upheld the 
discriminatory treatment of Japanese ineligible noncitizens in land 
ownership.
33
 Critically, it missed the opportunity to address two 
overlapping issues of that time: why citizenship should be a basis in the 
first instance in acquiring a property right and when a state limitation on a 
noncitizen‘s property rights has gone beyond the permissible boundaries 
of state police powers and shifted towards a form of unauthorized 
regulation of immigration law.  
This latter point leads to the third reason why examining Oyama‘s 
legacy is relevant today. The Supreme Court‘s failure to address the 
father‘s discrimination claim left untouched the power of states to regulate 
noncitizens‘ property rights. This broad power informs current claims by 
local governments that they have the authority to use their police powers 
to pass local housing restrictions that deny noncitizens, particularly those 
without authorized immigration status, the ability to rent property. When 
these laws are viewed through the lens of Oyama, the case reveals how 
these contemporary uses of local property laws—targeted mainly against 
Latina/o immigrants—may be understood to be the alien land laws of our 
time. Oyama forces a re-examination of the intersections of immigration, 
 
 
 33. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220–21 (1923) (affirming Washington‘s alien land law); 
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding California‘s alien land law); Webb v. 
O‘Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 322–24 (1923) (affirming California‘s alien land law); Frick v. Webb, 263 
U.S. 326, 333 (1923) (affirming California‘s alien land law). 
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citizenship law, race, and property law evident in these local housing 
ordinances and offers normative and prescriptive responses to them. At a 
minimum, Oyama shows the ease with which these contemporary property 
restrictions against noncitizens may become discriminatory against their 
U.S. citizen children. Even broader, the case offers an opportunity for 
courts to revisit what the Supreme Court neglected to do by determining 
whether states may continue to control noncitizens‘ property rights. 
Indeed, courts may choose to take the issues a step further by providing 
equal protection to the rights of unauthorized noncitizens to acquire a 
property interest, even if they are, technically, not members of the 
American polity.
34
  
Accordingly, this Article calls for recognizing Oyama‘s important 
historical and contemporary contribution to our understanding of race, 
property and citizenship. Acknowledging Oyama‘s critical role in history 
fills some of the gaps in our pedagogical and scholarly understanding of 
the struggle for equality in property law and equal citizenship. More 
broadly, the Article‘s analysis of the citizen/noncitizen distinction in 
property rights attempts to demonstrate the need to not only reconsider 
firmly entrenched views about state regulation of property rights of 
noncitizens, but also to address their contemporary implications.  
Part I examines the historical background, facts of the case, and 
Supreme Court opinion in Oyama. This Part explains where Oyama fits 
within the larger historical struggle for equal access to land ownership and 
how the case contributes to equal protection jurisprudence in property law. 
Part II analyzes the ways in which immigration and naturalization law 
shaped the development of property rights of noncitizens. This Part 
illustrates the neglected story of how the property rights of immigrants 
who were neither racially constructed as White or Black diminished as a 
result of laws that were, ironically, designed to expand the citizenship and 
property rights of racialized persons. Part III probes deeper into the heart 
of property law and analyzes the limits that Oyama imposed and liberated 
on the power of states to construct property rights. In so doing, this Part 
underscores the undertheorized citizen/noncitizen distinction in land rights 
and power of states to limit noncitizens‘ property rights that are implicated 
from the Oyama opinion. Part IV examines contemporary local ordinances 
against undocumented immigrants and explores the implications of 
 
 
 34. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS, ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
AMERICA 5 (2004) (stating that the term ―illegal alien‖ constitutes a ―new legal and political subject, 
whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a 
subject barred from citizenship and without rights‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
990 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:979 
 
 
 
 
Oyama‘s prescription to equality in property on these ordinances. The 
Conclusion calls for greater pedagogical and scholarly attention to Oyama 
in order to have a more robust understanding of how race and citizenship 
have shaped our historical and contemporary knowledge of property rights 
and equality.  
I. OYAMA V. CALIFORNIA AND THE CALIFORNIA ALIEN LAND LAW 
Property law has long been understood to regulate relations among 
persons.
35
 When viewed from the lens of U.S. racial history, this 
conception of property law would be incomplete without recognizing its 
critical role in the political, economic, and social ordering of people of 
color‘s prescribed place in society. For many who have been ―raced,‖36 
property law long constituted an important tool in their historical 
subordination,
37
 especially for those African Americans who were 
themselves considered property.
38
 Cases such as Buchanan v. Warley
39
 and 
Shelley v. Kraemer
40
 illustrate starkly the ways in which the promise of 
equality in property rights have long been denied and the ways in which 
the Supreme Court has sought to remove unconstitutional barriers to the 
realization of equal rights to own, enjoy, use, and transfer property.
41
  
Oyama v. California
42
 is a neglected yet important part of the historical 
narrative of the protracted struggle for equality in property law. As this 
 
 
 35. JOSEPH SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 2005) (―Property concerns relations 
among people, not relations between people and things.‖). 
 36. As critical race theorists have argued, race is socially and legally constructed. See, e.g., IAN 
F. HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 10 (1996) (―[T]o say race is 
socially constructed is to conclude that race is at least partially legally produced. Put most starkly, law 
constructs race.‖); Gotanda, supra note 32, at 258.  
 37. See Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
1511, 1523 (1991) (asserting that ―race is at the heart of American property law‖); Alfred L. Brophy, 
Integrating Spaces: New Perspectives on Race in the Property Curriculum, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 319, 
321 (2005) (explaining the ways that property law has been shaped by race); Cheryl I. Harris, 
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993) (stating that property rights are 
―contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with race‖). Elsewhere, I have also argued how 
property laws facilitated racial and political subordination. See Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum 
Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 821–24 (2008). 
 38. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
 39. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 41. See id. at 1 (holding that court enforcement of private covenants designed to discriminate 
against persons of ―Negro or Mongolian‖ descent constitutes state action in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 82 (holding that a city 
ordinance prohibiting racial integration on neighborhood blocks violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
by denying citizens the equal right to acquire and enjoy property and equal protection of the law). 
 42. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
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Part elucidates, the case demonstrates how race, property, immigration, 
and citizenship law functioned to construct the meaning of equality in 
property rights and citizenship. By striking down the section of 
California‘s Alien Land Law that annulled a citizen‘s right to own 
property because of his father‘s ancestry, Oyama represents a triumphant 
victory against racially discriminatory property laws that coalesced with 
immigration and nationality law and treated Japanese Americans as 
second-class citizens.  
A. Historical Context 
Similar to many immigrants who have been cast as racially inferior,
43
 
Japanese encountered discrimination in various aspects of their life. On the 
federal level, numerous pieces of legislation plus executive actions made it 
difficult for Japanese to gain entry into this country.
44
 In California, state 
laws hindered them from educating their children
45
 and, as this Article 
examines, acquiring property.
46
 Indeed, many Californians saw restrictions 
in property rights as a crucial method of deterring Japanese from coming 
to the state. In proposing the bill that ultimately became California‘s Alien 
Land Law of 1913,
47
 the state attorney general stated: 
 
 
 43. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 281 (stating that although ―[a]lienage status has not always 
been linked to race,‖ the term ―alien‖ has over time ―become equated with racial minorities‖). 
 44. See CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 30–37 (detailing immigration laws that were passed between 
1907 and 1924 to exclude Japanese from entering the country). For example, the Immigration Act of 
February 20, 1907, which led to the exclusion of contract workers, was directed at Japanese laborers. 
See id. at 30–33. The United States and Japan entered into what became known as ―Gentlemen‘s 
Agreement,‖ which required Japan to limit the number of Japanese migrating to the United States. See 
id. at 33–36. Moreover, in 1924, Congress passed the Immigration Quota Law, also known as the 
―Japanese Exclusion Act,‖ which excluded those persons ―ineligible to citizenship‖ from entering the 
country. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, repealed by Immigration and Nationality 
(McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, ch. 477, tit. IV, § 403(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163, 279. During post-World 
War II, the exclusion of those ineligible for citizenship led to the denial of entry of Japanese wives of 
U.S. citizens who sought admission to the U.S. under the War Brides Act of 1945. See Bonham v. 
Bouiss, 161 F.2d 678 (1947) (upholding the exclusion of ―a woman of one-half white, one-half 
Japanese blood‖ because, despite being a war bride, she was inadmissible under immigration law 
based on her ineligibility for citizenship). 
 45. See CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 20 (explaining that on October 11, 1906, the San Francisco 
Board of Education adopted a resolution to segregate Japanese students in the public school system).  
 46. See id. at 41 (noting that other anti-Japanese legislation that have been proposed included 
limiting their right to marry, vote and run for public office). 
 47. See id. at 46–48. Although the Alien Land Law was enacted in 1913, several proposals to 
limit land ownership by Japanese farmers were introduced a few years earlier. See id. at 41–43 
(explaining, for instance, that the Alien Land Bill of 1909 which required noncitizens who purchased 
property to file for citizenship within five years or lose property was directed at Japanese because they 
were ineligible for citizenship). 
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It is unimportant and foreign to the question, whether a particular 
race is inferior. The simple and single question is, is the race 
desirable. . . . It [the law] seeks to limit their presence by curtailing 
their privileges which they may enjoy here; for they will not come 
in large numbers and long abide with us if they may not acquire 
land.
48
  
Critically, white farmers specifically wanted to prevent the ―Issei‖ or 
first-generation Japanese immigrants from owning land.
49
 The law 
prohibited ―aliens ineligible for American citizenship‖ from acquiring, 
owning, occupying, or leasing lands for more than three years or 
transferring agricultural land.
50
 Since Japanese were not able to naturalize 
under the law, the phrase ―aliens ineligible to citizenship‖ thus constituted 
a euphemism employed to cover up the law‘s underlying discriminatory 
intent.
51
  
The Alien Land Law provided that land acquired by persons who were 
ineligible for citizenship would escheat, or transfer to the state, after the 
government proved that the land was in fact bought to evade the law.
52
 
Notably, all escheat actions undertaken by the state, albeit not a substantial 
number, were against Japanese, evidencing the Alien Land Law‘s intent to 
drive Japanese away from California.
53
  
Despite the restriction on real property ownership, Japanese 
landholding increased.
54
 Legal loopholes in the law facilitated 
circumvention of its proscriptions and state authorities were disinclined to 
prosecute.
55
 In 1920, however, a ballot initiative intended to strengthen the 
law overwhelmingly passed in California.
56
 The 1920 voter initiative 
exemplifies the ways in which the initiative process can have a particularly 
subordinating effect on noncitizens because of their inability to participate 
 
 
 48. CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 48 (quoting a speech made by the state attorney general about the 
Alien Land Law of 1913). 
 49. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 39.  
 50. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 636 (1948); CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 49. 
 51. CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 48. 
 52. See id. at 49. 
 53. See id. at 48. 
 54. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 56 (noting that ownership of lands by Japanese actually increased 
after 1913 because Japanese noncitizens placed purchased lands in trusts and guardianships for their 
U.S.-born children, formed corporations that owned land under its corporate name, or put lands under 
the names of friends or U.S. citizen relatives).  
 55. See id.; see also Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 33 (explaining that legal loopholes 
enabled Japanese noncitizens to acquire property in some form). 
 56. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 57.  
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in the election process.
57
 The law proscribed ―aliens ineligible to 
citizenship‖ from being placed under guardianships or trusteeships,58 
prevented all agricultural lands from being leased,
59
 and prohibited 
corporations owned by a majority of persons who were ineligible to be 
naturalized from owning real property,
60
 all of which had previously 
enabled Japanese noncitizens to acquire property.
61
 The enhanced Alien 
Land Law led to the decrease of Japanese ownership of lands.
62
 
Without doubt, the Alien Land Law‘s differential treatment of persons 
ineligible for citizenship in general and Japanese noncitizens in particular 
implicated the Equal Protection Clause of the
 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Decades before the state passed the Alien Land Law, the Supreme Court 
decided Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
63
 which established that the Equal Protection 
Clause protected persons, including noncitizens, against laws that may on 
their face appear neutral but are applied or administered in an unequal or 
discriminatory manner.
64
 Moreover, as in Yick Wo, the alien land laws 
concerned property interests as well.
65
 Despite Yick Wo‘s pronouncement 
of equality, constitutional challenges to the Alien Land Law failed.
66
 
Specifically, in a series of cases decided within the same week, the 
Supreme Court held that the alien land laws of California and Washington 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
67
  
 
 
 57. Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not ―Sleeping,‖ Giant: The Devastating Impact of the 
Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1268–71 (2008) 
(discussing how voter initiatives have a particularly negative impact on immigrants because they are 
unable to participate in the democratic process and thus they become susceptible to subordination). 
 58. See 1920 Alien Land Law, California Initiative (Nov. 2, 1920). 
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 56–57. 
 62. See CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 49–50; Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 34; Aoki, 
supra note 24, at 59. 
 63. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).  
 64. See id. at 374 (holding that the San Francisco ordinance that was race-neutral was 
administered in a discriminatory manner against Chinese immigrants and was thus unconstitutional).  
 65. See Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1373 (explaining that Yick Wo v. Hopkins was a case that concerned the protection 
of property rights regardless of race that was protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 66. See id. at 1378–84 (exploring why Yick Wo has had limited impact on racial equality cases). 
But see Thomas W. Joo, Yick Wo Revisited: Nonblack Nonwhites and Fourteenth Amendment 
History, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1427, 1436–40 (critiquing Chin‘s arguments). 
 67. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (holding that Washington‘s Anti-Alien Land 
Law, which prohibited all aliens ineligible for citizenship from leasing agricultural land for more than 
five years was constitutional); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (holding that California‘s 
prohibition on leaseholds of a term of five years by aliens ineligible for citizenship did not violate the 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Webb v. O‘Brien, 
263 U.S. 313 (1923) (holding that California‘s Alien Land Law prohibited sharecropping between 
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Significantly, the Supreme Court‘s analyses in these cases emphasized 
federalism principles while simultaneously ignoring equal protection 
implications of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment, according to the 
Court in Terrace v. Thompson,
68
 did not ―take away from the State those 
powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution,‖69 which include the power of the state to ―deny to aliens the 
right to own land within its borders.‖70 Indeed, as discussed in more detail 
in Part III infra, states have long been recognized to have the authority to 
regulate noncitizens‘ property rights. That states may not exercise this 
authority in a racially discriminatory matter was made clear in Yick Wo.
71
 
Yet, the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Terrace and its progeny ignored the 
racial implications of the laws. At the outset, the Court expressly 
recognized that the naturalization law limited the right to become citizens 
to ―free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent.‖72 
Noting this, the Court acknowledged that although immigrants from 
European countries were eligible for citizenship, those from Japan and 
China were not.
73
 Yet, the Court emphasized that states could 
appropriately rely on such classifications as Congress might enact in 
exercising its state police powers in allocating property rights.
74
 That the 
property restrictions impacted Japanese and thus were race-based was, 
according to the Supreme Court, ―without foundation.‖75 Because the law 
applied to ―[a]ll persons of whatever color or race who have not declared 
their intention in good faith to become citizens,‖76 the law did not offend 
the Equal Protection Clause.
77
 Thus, through Terrace and its progeny, the 
Supreme Court enabled the alien land laws to continue to restrict land 
ownership to Japanese. 
 
 
citizen and Japanese farmer); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923) (holding that California‘s Alien 
Land Law, which prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship from owning shares of stock of 
corporation was consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Part III.B infra and 
accompanying notes (providing a more in-depth discussion of these cases). 
 68. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 197. 
 69. Id. at 217. 
 70. Id.  
 71. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (―[T]he denial of equal justice is still 
within the prohibition of the Constitution.‖). 
 72. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 220–21; see Chin, supra note 65, at 1383 (explaining that the alien land laws were 
upheld on the principle that because Congress can discriminate based on race, so too can the states). 
 75. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 221. 
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In California, as well as other states, the formal restriction on Japanese 
landholding did not necessarily halt all land transactions that involved 
Japanese buyers. Private sale of land continued
78
 and the state minimally 
enforced the law. In fact, between 1913 and 1942, the state undertook only 
fourteen escheat actions,
79
 illuminating that both private and public actors 
openly ignored the law. This is not to say, of course, that the Alien Land 
Law did not impact the nature of one‘s ownership. To the contrary, the law 
had the practical effect of putting a cloud on the title of property owned by 
Japanese Americans. In particular, the Alien Land Law turned property 
that would normally be held in fee simple into one that became subject to 
an escheat action by the state.
80
 Moreover, Japanese Americans had the 
burden of disproving the presumption that the purchase of the property 
was not done in violation of the law.
81
  
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the evacuation of Japanese from 
California and other states, California sought to more forcefully enforce 
the Alien Land Law. As a result of legislative initiative to fund escheat 
suits, the Attorney General filed more escheat actions than before 1942. 
Specifically, five years after 1942, it undertook fifty-nine escheat 
actions.
82
 Importantly, all these actions—similar to the ones prior to 
1942—involved lands owned by Japanese.83 Many of these escheat actions 
were filed at the behest of white farmers who argued for more vigorous 
enforcement of the law.
84
 This is a crucial point because it demonstrates a 
methodical public and private approach to rid the state of Japanese that the 
internment ultimately failed to do. Specifically, as the facts of the case 
illustrate, the state utilized property law to ensure the exclusion of 
Japanese from its borders. 
 
 
 78. Indeed, a California appellate court had held that land transactions entered into by private 
parties were not necessarily void under the Alien Land Law. See Suwa v. Johnson, 203 P. 414, 415 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (rejecting attempt by lessor to invalidate a lease he entered into with lessee 
because the lease violated California‘s Alien Land Law holding that only the Attorney General of the 
state may void the transaction).  
 79. See ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 33. 
 80. See 1920 Alien Land Law, supra note 58. 
 81. See id.  
 82. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 661 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 83. See id.  
 84. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 59 n.59 
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B. Facts of the Case 
In 1934, Kajiro Oyama purchased six acres of agricultural land and 
placed the title of the land in his son Fred‘s name.85 At the time, Fred was 
only six years-old.
86
 Similar to other ineligible alien parents who bought 
property for their children, Kajiro petitioned a local court to become 
Fred‘s guardian in order for him to have legal authority to manage the 
property. The court granted his guardianship application.
87
 When Fred was 
nine-years-old, his father purchased another two acres of land in his 
name.
88
  
Buying agricultural property for young children may seem odd to 
many, but for Japanese families like the Oyamas, it was the only way that 
they could own land. Notably, such purchases were far from clandestine. 
Kajiro‘s purchases displayed the public manner with which some land 
transactions were made in the 1930s. Both land transactions were not only 
known but approved by the court. Kajiro‘s petition for guardianship after 
acquiring six acres in 1934 demonstrated that the local court understood 
that Fred‘s ―ownership‖ was a legal fiction. Kajiro was the de facto owner, 
even if the law did not recognize him as the legal owner. It also shows that 
the court acquiesced to the purchase by approving the guardianship 
petition.
89
  
Moreover, as noted previously, the Alien Land Law did not prevent all 
Japanese from acquiring property. Kajiro Oyama, for example, purchased 
both properties well past the enactment of the 1920 law. The subsequent 
purchase occurred in 1937 and was similarly placed under Fred‘s name. 
Like the earlier transaction, this one was noted in public newspapers and 
hearings.
90
 Thus, despite the apparent violations of the Alien Land Law, 
local government officials were not only aware, but condoned, the private 
transactions.
91
  
Eventually, the Oyama property became subject to escheat 
proceedings. In August of 1944, the state petitioned to acquire the 
properties on the ground that the purchases were done with intent to 
 
 
 85. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 636. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 637. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 636–37. 
 90. Id. at 637. 
 91. See id; see also Comment, The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 YALE L.J. 1017, 1024 
(1947) (―The courts themselves on occasion winked at devices clearly designed to avoid the stringency 
of the laws.‖) [hereinafter Comment, Alien Land Laws]. 
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violate and evade the Alien Land Law.
92
 By this time, E.O. 9066 had gone 
into effect and the Oyamas had been residing in Utah for about two 
years.
93
 Although Fred had title to the land, both he and Kajiro were 
named defendants to the escheat action.
94
  
Through their counsel, both defendants argued against the 
constitutionality of the law. First, they argued that the Alien Land Law 
deprived Fred Oyama of his right as an American citizen to equal 
protection of the law.
95
 Second, they contended that the law also denied 
Kajiro, despite being a noncitizen, of the equal protection of the law.
96
 
Finally, they asserted violation of the Due Process Clause on the grounds 
that the state had brought an action to take property after the expiration of 
the statute of limitations.
97
  
The California Superior Court, however, agreed with the state and 
eventually upheld the validity of the relevant provisions of Alien Land 
Law.
98
 Specifically, it found that Kajiro had the beneficial use of the land, 
and that the conveyances were ―subterfuges effected with intent to 
prevent, evade or avoid escheat.‖99 It based its findings in part on the 
testimony of two witnesses.
100
 First, a white neighbor of the Oyamas, who 
ended up taking care of the property while the Oyamas were away, 
testified for the state that Kajiro ―was running the boy‘s business.‖101 
Second, the state called a court clerk to testify about the records that had 
been filed with the court regarding the conveyance of the two 
properties.
102
  
Notably, neither the court nor Oyama‘s lawyer called Kajiro to the 
stand to testify.
103
 Kajiro had driven in from Utah and was in fact present 
at the hearing.
104
 When asked by the court as to whether Kajiro would 
 
 
 92. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 637; see also Comment, Alien Land Laws, supra note 91, at 1017 (―The 
states, inspired by war strengthened anti-Japanese sentiment, have undertaken a revitalized campaign 
to enforce the prohibitions against the holding of agricultural land by aliens ineligible for citizenship—
which, in effect, means the Japanese.‖).  
 93. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 637 (noting that the Oyama family was evacuated in 1942).  
 94. In addition to Fred Oyama and his father, Kajiro Oyama, another named defendant was June 
Kushino. See id. at 635.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 635–36. 
 98. Id. at 638–39. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 638. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. See Transcript of Record at 98, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (No. 44-371). 
 104. See id. 
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testify, his lawyer explained that he did not speak English well and thus 
could not provide testimony.
105
 Not knowing what Kajiro might have said, 
it is difficult to know with certainty whether his testimony could have 
helped to rebut the presumption that he intended to evade the Alien Land 
Law.
106
 The trial judge inferred, however, that Kajiro‘s ―testimony would 
have been adverse to his son‘s cause.‖107  
The California Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the lower 
court.
108
 It held, among other things, that the state could ―constitutionally 
exclude ineligible aliens from any interest in agricultural land.‖109 As to 
Fred‘s property rights, the court did not find any constitutional violation, 
contending that the property never vested in him and had passed directly 
to the state.
110
  
The Oyamas and their organizational supporters, particularly the 
Japanese American Citizens League, then decided to launch another 
challenge to California‘s Alien Land Law by petitioning for certification 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
111
 Although the Supreme Court had previously 
upheld the constitutionality of the Washington and California alien land 
laws decades before, they hoped to extend the new reasoning that the 
Supreme Court had developed in recent cases involving Japanese 
Americans to the area of property ownership. Ironically, both Korematsu 
and Hirabayashi v. United States,
112
 which upheld the validity of the 
military‘s exclusion and curfew orders against Japanese,113 led to a more 
restrictive analysis of classifications that are based on race.
114
 Because of 
the correlation between ancestry and property restrictions, the Alien Land 
Law‘s constitutionality ultimately went before the Supreme Court again.  
 
 
 105. See id. 
 106. Additionally, Fred Oyama himself could have testified, but his father did not ask him to 
attend. See Letter of Fred Oyama to Rose Cuison Villazor (July 30, 2008) (Response to Question No. 
12, ―Do you recall being asked to attend [the escheat] trial?‖); Telephone Interview with Fred 
Yoshihiro Oyama, July 12, 2008. 
 107. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 639. 
 108. Id. at 639–40 (primarily relying on the trial court‘s findings and inferences). 
 109. Id. at 639 (relying primarily on Terrace and and progeny). 
 110. See id. at 640. 
 111. Oyama v. California was in fact a test case. According to Fred Oyama, the Japanese 
American Citizens League and American Civil Liberties Union ―reviewed hundreds of cases, if not 
thousands, and felt that our particular legal profile had the best chance of winning.‖ Letter of Fred 
Oyama to Rose Cuison Villazor (July 30, 2008) (Response to Question No. 13, ―How did your father 
obtain a lawyer to represent him and you at [the escheat] trial?‖). 
 112. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 113. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92. 
 114. See Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 30–31 (contending that both Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu provided the foundation for the doctrine of strict scrutiny). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] REDISCOVERING OYAMA V. CALIFORNIA 999 
 
 
 
 
C. Supreme Court Opinions 
Collectively, there were five separate opinions in Oyama—the 
majority, two concurring opinions, and two dissenting opinions. The 
petitioners appealed and the parties briefed the same three constitutional 
issues they raised in the lower courts.
115
 In the end, the Oyama opinions 
expressed the Justices‘ conception of the intersections among race, 
citizenship, and property, but in varying degrees and significance. 
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Vinson, only 
addressed the first issue raised on appeal. Specifically, it held that the state 
discriminated against Fred ―solely on his parents‘ country of origin‖ and 
that there was no ―compelling justification‖ to support such 
discrimination.
116
 The use of this ―constitutional test‖ was crucial, for it 
was an early application of what later emerged to be strict scrutiny.
117
  
Chief Justice Vinson based the conclusion on a ―federal statute‖ that 
was ―enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment, but vindicated by it.‖118 
Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the majority held that states must ―accord to all 
citizens the right to take and hold real property.‖119 In the instant case, the 
state violated the equal protection rights of Fred, an American citizen, in a 
number of ways. First, unlike other U.S. citizen children in California, 
Fred had to overcome a statutory presumption that the land purchased for 
him by his father and placed under his name did not constitute a bona fide 
gift to him at all.
120
 Other U.S. citizen children did not have such a burden 
and, in fact, had the opposite benefit of having their gifts deemed 
presumptively valid, requiring the right to property to be disproved by 
whoever was attacking its validity.
121
  
Second, under the law in question, Fred‘s father‘s ineligibility for 
citizenship counted as further evidence that the purchase was done in 
violation of the law.
122
 By contrast, other U.S. citizens‘ gifts were deemed 
valid gifts regardless of their parents‘ eligibility for citizenship.123 Third, 
Fred had to disprove evidence that his father failed in his duties as the 
guardian of the property.
124
 Overall, Chief Justice Vinson wrote that the 
 
 
 115. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635–36. 
 116. Id. at 640. 
 117. See Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 30–31. 
 118. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 640. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 642. 
 121. Id. at 641. 
 122. Id. at 642. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 642–43. 
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―cumulative effect . . . was clearly to discriminate against Fred Oyama‖ 
because ―[h]e was saddled with an onerous burden of proof which need 
not be borne by California children generally.‖125  
Critically, Chief Justice Vinson wrote that the only basis for the 
discriminatory treatment of Fred was the fact that his father was 
Japanese.
126
 Land purchased for children of foreigners who were not 
Japanese resulted in indefeasible estates; by contrast, land bought by 
Japanese parents had a type of a determinable estate.
127
 Paradoxically, the 
majority opinion relied on what is now a famous quote from Hirabayashi 
v. United States to support its conclusion: ―Distinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.‖128 
Ultimately, the majority held that when a state‘s landholding policy 
conflicts with the rights of an American citizen to own land, ―the rights of 
a citizen may not be subordinated merely because of his father‘s country 
of origin.‖129 Having decided the first issue, the majority opted not to 
address the two remaining issues concerning the property rights of 
noncitizens and the allegation of an unconstitutional taking. 
Unlike the majority opinion, the concurring opinions separately written 
by Justices Black and Murphy directly addressed the equal protection 
argument of Kajiro Oyama. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, 
opined that the Alien Land Law constituted a blatant violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
130
 According to Justice 
Black, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying to ―some 
groups on account of their race or color, any rights, privileges, and 
opportunities accorded to other groups.‖131 Indeed, he would have 
overturned the previous cases that upheld the Alien Land Laws.
132
 
Moreover, Justice Black believed that the state was infringing on 
Congress‘s ―exclusive power over immigration.‖133 Explaining that the 
California Supreme Court recognized that the Alien Land Law was 
intended to discourage Japanese from entering California, Justice Black 
 
 
 125. Id. at 644. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 645. 
 128. Id. at 646 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
 129. Id. at 647. 
 130. Id. (Black, J., concurring) (―The California law in actual effect singles out aliens of Japanese 
ancestry . . . .‖). Justice Black also contended that the Alien Land Law violated the U.S.-Japanese 
Treaty of 1911. See id. at 648.  
 131. Id. at 649. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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stated that the law created barriers ―designed to prevent the immigration of 
people whom Congress has authorized to come into and remain in the 
country.‖134 Finally, Justice Black argued that the law was inconsistent 
with the U.S. pledge to human rights under the U.N. Charter.
135
  
Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, also agreed that the Alien 
Land Law should be overturned, but his opinion more vigorously 
criticized the racist purpose of the law to discriminate against Japanese.
136
 
Importantly, he expressed the view that the protection against racial 
discrimination was not contingent on citizenship status. His lengthy 
opinion highlighted the relationships among nativism, racism, citizenship, 
and property law that were designed to ―discourage the Japanese from 
entering California and to drive out those who were already there.‖137 
Moreover, he focused on the way in which the state was able to utilize the 
racialized federal naturalization law to ―exclude Japanese aliens from the 
ownership and use of farm land.‖138 Importantly, Justice Murphy 
emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected any person, including Japanese immigrants who 
were ineligible for citizenship, from discrimination by the states.
139
  
 
 
 134. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941)).  
 135. Id. at 649–50. Justice Black‘s invocation of the U.N. Charter in his concurrence marked the 
first time that the charter made an appearance in a Supreme Court opinion. See Judith Resnick, Law‘s 
Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism‘s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 
YALE L.J. 1564, 1600–04 (2006) (discussing litigation efforts to use the U.N. Charter as legal basis for 
invalidating racially restrictive covenants and California‘s Alien Land Law). 
 136. Id. at 651 (Murphy, J., concurring) (―The California statute in question, as I view it, is 
nothing more than an outright racial discrimination.‖). For a fuller examination of Justice Murphy‘s 
powerful and lengthy concurrence, see Randall Kennedy, Justice Murphy‘s Concurrence in Oyama v. 
California; Cussing Out Racism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1245 (1996).  
 137. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 657 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 660 (―Congress supplied a ready-made vehicle for discriminating against Japanese 
aliens, a vehicle which California was prompt to grasp and expand to purposes quite beyond the scope 
or object of the Congressional statute.‖). 
 139. Id. at 663. Justice Murphy expressed six specific reasons that the Alien Land Law failed to 
meet the Constitutional standards of equal protection: 1. California‘s supposed adoption of Congress‘s 
racial distinctions with regard to citizenship for use in property ownership was unreasonable, 2. use of 
eligibility for citizenship was irrational in determining loyalty, as evidenced by the lengthy duration of 
many ineligible aliens‘ presence in the United States, 3. the idea that ineligible Japanese could take 
over all agricultural land in California was ―statistically absurd,‖ id. at 667, and therefore not a rational 
justification for racial discrimination, 4. highly efficient farming and a lower standard of living were 
not rational justifications for such discrimination because of the inherent characteristic of competition 
in the American marketplace and the need for more than a lower standard of living as a justification 
for perpetuating such a low standard, 5. the use of half-truths and misrepresentations about Japanese 
have been exposed and ―form no rational basis‖ for statutory regulation, and 6. the cultural, physical 
and linguistic differences between Japanese and Americans did not evidence some racial characteristic 
making them unfit to own agricultural land. Id. at 663–72. It should be noted that Justice Murphy also 
agreed that the Alien Land Law violated the U.N. Charter. See id. at 674 (stating that the Alien Land 
Law contravenes the nation‘s pledge ―through the United Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and 
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The dissents, written by Justices Reed and Jackson, opined that the 
Alien Land Law did not violate equal protection principles. Justice Reed 
believed that the state was validly exercising its police power to restrict 
the landownership rights of noncitizens.
140
 He opined that the Court could 
not set aside the judgment without invalidating the Alien Land Law.
141
 
Justice Jackson contended that he did not think that the judgment was 
correct unless the Court was prepared to invalidate the Alien Land Law.
142
  
In sum, the Supreme Court held that the State of California‘s attempted 
taking of Fred Oyama‘s property by enforcing the Alien Land Law against 
him because of his father‘s ancestry constituted a form of race 
discrimination. In so doing, it immediately led to the end of the 
enforcement of the Alien Land Law
143
 and became part of a historical shift 
in the treatment of Japanese in California. Specifically, several months 
after the Supreme Court decided Oyama, voters rejected a proposed 
initiative that would have amended the Alien Land Law.
144
 Oyama also led 
to the invalidation of the alien land law in Oregon the following year.
145
 
Eventually, the California Supreme Court declared the Alien Land Law 
unconstitutional in Sei Fujii v. California.
146
  
Beyond the Oyama opinion‘s invalidation of property barriers that 
denied Japanese Americans their right to equal access to property, Oyama 
also more broadly contributed to nullifying discriminatory property laws 
that similarly precluded other people of color, particularly African 
Americans, from owning property. Specifically, four months after the 
Supreme Court decided Oyama, the Court handed down its decision in 
Shelley v. Kraemer.
147
 In Shelley, the Supreme Court relied on Oyama to 
invalidate private racial covenants that prohibited the occupancy of 
property by ―any person not of the Caucasian race.‖148 The Court 
explained that it had recently held in Oyama that state laws that ―denied 
 
 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language and religion‖). 
 140. Id. at 674. 
 141. Id. at 684. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See Constitutional Law: Equal Protection of the Laws: Presumption of Intent to Evade 
Escheat in California Alien Land Law, supra note 26, at 324 (―The Attorney General of California has 
interpreted it as ending the practical utility of the alien land law, and has indicated his intention to 
dismiss all the escheat cases pending before the California courts.‖). 
 144. Aoki, supra note 24, at 64.  
 145. See Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 575–79 (Or. 1949) (relying in part on Oyama v. 
California to invalidate Oregon‘s alien land law). 
 146. 242 P.2d 617, 630 (Cal. 1952).  
 147. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 148. Id. at 5. 
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equal enjoyment of property rights to a designated class of citizens of 
specified race and ancestry‖ constituted a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
149
 Oyama thus played a central role in ensuring that private 
discrimination would not find legal manifestation through judicial 
enforcement of these racial covenants.
150
  
In short, Oyama affirmed the constitutional and statutory guarantees of 
equal access to property regardless of race. California‘s Alien Land Law 
demonstrated the potent way that race, property law, immigration, and 
citizenship operated to subordinate persons on account of their ancestral 
and racial background. Oyama thus generally served to restore the 
constitutional mandate of equality in property law and specifically halted 
the enduring discrimination faced by Japanese families even after they 
were released from their internment. More broadly, it provided important 
precedent in civil rights law.
151
  
II. EXPLORING OYAMA‘S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERSECTION OF 
PROPERTY, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP 
As the foregoing analysis highlighted, California‘s Alien Land Law 
demonstrates the ways in which race, property, immigration, and 
citizenship law intersected to determine the meaning of equal access to 
land ownership. This Part aims to unpack the complicated interrelations 
among these areas of law recognized in Oyama. In so doing, it asserts 
Oyama‘s unique contributions to doctrinal and theoretical understanding 
of property rights, citizenship, and race. First, it adds to current 
discussions of the positive and negative attributes of relying on citizenship 
as a basis of rights. By protecting the rights of Fred Oyama, the U.S. 
citizen son, the Supreme Court unequivocally affirmed the importance of 
citizenship.
152
 Yet, the Court‘s failure to address the equal protection claim 
 
 
 149. Id. at 21. 
 150. See id.; Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 39–45 (positing the influence of Oyama v. 
California on Shelley v. Kraemer and subsequent civil rights cases). 
 151. Shelley v. Kraemer has been described as one of the most important civil rights cases before 
Brown v. Board of Education. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Introduction: Brown in the Supreme Court, 6 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 11, 13 (2004) (describing Shelley v. Kraemer as the ―most important case to 
that point involving racial discrimination after World War II‖). 
 152. The significance, if any, of citizenship has long been a contested topic of discussion. See, 
e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 53–54 (1975) (commenting that ―we live 
under a Constitution to which the concept of citizenship matters very little‖); Saito, supra note 30, at 
272 (―The importance of citizenship depends on one‘s perspective. On the one hand, in a world of 
nation states, being a citizen of some state is extremely important, and rendering a person stateless is 
considered a violation of the most basic of human rights. On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution 
extends many protections to ‗persons‘ rather than citizens . . . .‖). For recent work that examines the 
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of Kajiro Oyama, Fred‘s noncitizen father, conveys the drawbacks of 
grounding one‘s rights on citizenship.  
Second, Oyama deepens our understanding of the historical struggle for 
equality in property law faced by racialized persons. Scholars have long 
explored how racism operated in property law in ways that denied people 
of color equal citizenship. This account of the development of property 
rights, however, provides only a partial story of the way in which the 
property and citizenship rights of Asian Americans in general, and 
Japanese Americans in particular, were constructed. In the end, Oyama 
illustrates that a more robust account of the relationships among property, 
citizenship, and racism can be made when we examine how immigration 
and nationality law interjected in the development of equality in property 
rights.  
A. Property Rights as Core Citizenship Rights 
1. Restoring the Property Rights of the (Alien) Citizen 
No doubt that the most important doctrinal lesson from Oyama is the 
affirmation of equal access to property as a right of citizenship regardless 
of one‘s race or ancestry.153 The case demonstrates the powerful way in 
which the racist Alien Land Law erased Japanese Americans‘ membership 
within the polity and turned them into what Mae Ngai calls ―alien 
citizens.‖154 The ―alien citizen,‖ Professor Ngai explains, ―is an American 
citizen by virtue of her birth in the United States but whose citizenship is 
suspect, if not denied, on account of the racialized identity of her 
immigrant ancestry.‖155 Here, the Alien Land Law ascribed the foreigner 
status of Japanese Americans‘ parents to their children and subsequently 
erased their formal citizenship and an important right of citizenship—the 
right to equal access to property.
156
  
 
 
importance of citizenship, see PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER 
GLOBALIZATION 81 (2008) (―[I]n fact, citizenship makes very little difference.‖); LINDA BOSNIAK, 
THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 19 (2006) (discussing 
various definitions of citizenship); Jonathan Weinberg, The End of Citizenship?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
931 (2009) (challenging Peter Spiro‘s claim that citizenship is in decline).  
 153. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (―[T]he rights of a citizen may not be 
subordinated merely because of his father‘s country of origin.‖).  
 154. Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2521 
(2007). 
 155. Id. (―Racism thus creates a problem of misrecognition for the citizen of Asian or Latino 
descent and, more recently, the citizen who appears to be ‗Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim.‘‖). 
 156. See Saito, supra note 30, at 307–10 (explaining the construction of Asian Americans as 
―perpetual outsiders‖).  
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The nonrecognition of Japanese Americans‘ citizenship was not 
without cost. As Keith Aoki noted, the imposition of alien status made it 
possible for them to be removed from their homes and placed in 
concentration camps in the 1940s.
157
 From the context of the Alien Land 
Law, the law‘s ascription of foreignness on Japanese Americans158 made it 
easy for the government to deny them their rights to equal access to own 
property and enjoy the benefits of property ownership that other American 
children enjoyed. When compared to other U.S. citizens, many Japanese 
Americans were unable to benefit from the transfer of wealth typically 
associated with land ownership that was available to other American 
children as a result of their parents‘ inability to purchase property.159 
Additionally, for those Japanese Americans like Fred Oyama whose 
parents had chosen to buy property for them, the nature of their property 
ownership also showed their unequal citizenship status. Unlike other 
American citizens whose parents were eligible for citizenship and 
consequently able to purchase land for them as gifts and confer them with 
property in the nature of fee simple absolute, Japanese Americans‘ parents 
could only give them what amounted to some type of a defeasible fee. 
Specifically, it appears that Fred Oyama had a property interest that was 
akin to a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent because, although 
the purchase of the property initially appeared to be a fee simple absolute, 
it was one that could be taken away by the state through an escheat action. 
As the facts of Oyama evidenced, any property could in principle be 
escheated by the state at any time, no matter how long a Japanese 
American had owned the property.
160
  
Indeed, the state‘s ability to take ownership of the property through the 
escheat action may arguably be described as a form of expatriation or loss 
of citizenship.
161
 Scholars have long pointed out how the loss of one‘s 
 
 
 157. Aoki, supra note 24, at 68 (―The ―Alien Land Laws provided a bridge that sustained the 
virulent anti-Asian animus that linked the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 with the internment of 
Japanese-American citizens pursuant to Executive Order 9066.‖).  
 158. Id. at 66 (―The Alien Land Laws ideologically affirmed the ‗foreign-ness,‘ and hence, 
‗disloyalty‘ of the Issei and their American citizen children . . . .‖). 
 159. See Daria Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 373, 382–84 (2008) 
(explaining that intergenerational transfer of wealth is tied to property ownership and that ongoing 
racial disparities in poverty relates to racial inequities in home ownership).  
 160. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 637 (1948). 
 161. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, there are at least two ways by which one could 
lose her citizenship. One way is through the revocation of one‘s citizenship obtained by naturalization. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2006). The other is through a citizen‘s voluntary act that she intends to 
relinquish her citizenship, which applies to both ―native-born or naturalized citizens.‖  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1481 (2006). 
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property may constitute a loss of one‘s self.162 In this instance, the loss of 
Fred Oyama‘s property as a result of the escheat action constituted a form 
of taking of his own citizenship. When asked about his reaction to the 
state‘s escheat action, Fred Oyama explained that he felt like a ―man 
without a country.‖163 Coming from an American who at the time had to 
leave his home state as a result of E.O. 9066,
164
 Fred‘s statement about the 
loss of his property powerfully evinced his view of the correlation between 
the denial of property rights and removal of one‘s formal membership to 
the polity. Indeed, when placed within the context of the tremendous loss 
of property precipitated by E.O. 9066,
165
 the state‘s heightened 
enforcement of the Alien Land Law through the escheat actions while 
Japanese Americans were interned and upon their return
166
 further 
demonstrated their functional loss of citizenship.
167
 The state‘s coordinated 
action to drive them away from their homes conveyed that, despite being 
Americans, they did not belong.  
The Oyama Court‘s protection of the property rights of U.S. citizens of 
Japanese ancestry thus constituted the affirmation of formal and 
substantive right of equal citizenship that had been denied to Japanese 
Americans by California. As the Supreme Court aptly explained, where 
there is a ―conflict between the State‘s right to formulate a policy of 
landholding within its bounds and the right of American citizens to own 
land anywhere in the United States. . . . [T]he rights of a citizen may not 
be subordinated merely because of his father‘s country of origin.‖168 By 
 
 
 162. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (―One 
may gauge the strength or significance of someone‘s relationship with an object by the kind of pain 
that would be occasioned by its loss. On this view, an object is closely related to one‘s personhood if 
its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object‘s replacement. If so, that particular object is 
bound up with the holder.‖).  
 163. Letter from Fred Oyama to Rose Cuison Villazor (July 30, 2008) (on file with Washington 
University Law Review) (Response to Question No. 6, ―What was your reaction to [the order to intern 
all persons of Japanese ancestry]? How did you feel about leaving your home?‖).  
 164. See supra Part I (explaining that the Oyama family left California for Utah). 
 165. See CHUMAN, supra note 23, at 242–43 (approximating that the total economic loss due to 
the internment was about $700,000,000); Aoki, supra note 24, at 64 n.67.  
 166. More than sixty percent of the Japanese interned were U.S. citizens. See ROBINSON, supra 
note 23, at 4. 
 167. Admittedly, expatriation is not an exact analogy because this process of losing one‘s 
citizenship presumes one‘s voluntary desire to do so and Fred Oyama did not want to lose his property. 
Under the regulations, the loss of one‘s citizenship must be done affirmatively with the specific 
intention to lose one‘s citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (2006). The other way in which one can lose 
citizenship—denaturalization—is similarly inapposite here because that procedure relates to persons 
who have been naturalized U.S. citizens and not to a person who acquired citizenship by birth. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2006). My only point here is to show how the taking of one‘s property can be 
tantamount to a loss of some form of one‘s sense of citizenship or belonging.   
 168. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948). 
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invalidating the Alien Land Law as applied to them, Oyama removed the 
mask that covered Japanese Americans‘ citizenship and marked them as 
―foreign‖ U.S. citizens. Indeed, as at least one scholar noted, the Oyama 
opinion was arguably the Supreme Court‘s way of atoning for its mistake 
in Korematsu.
169
 
2. Ignoring the Noncitizen‘s Property Rights 
Although the Oyama Court boldly restored the citizenship rights of 
Japanese Americans, it missed the critical opportunity to invalidate the 
racially discriminatory treatment of noncitizens of Japanese ancestry by 
opting not to address the equal protection claim of Kajiro, the noncitizen 
father. In so doing, the Oyama opinion demonstrates the troubling 
consequences effected by relying on citizenship as a basis for rights. As 
citizenship scholars have noted, the concept of citizenship presumes the 
validity of noncitizenship and, by extension, the validity of laws that treat 
them unequally.
170
 Recognizing one‘s right as a privilege of citizenship on 
the one hand means that, on the other hand, another person may be 
appropriately denied the same right due to her lack of formal memership 
status.
171
  
A theoretical examination of the citizen/noncitizen distinction in 
property ownership reveals a complex relationship between citizenship 
and equality. On the one hand, grounding one‘s rights based on citizenship 
is normatively questionable, as revealed in Oyama. By recognizing 
equality in property rights as a privilege of U.S. citizenship
172
 and not 
personhood as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Oyama 
Court facilitated discriminatory property laws against Japanese noncitizens 
to continue.
173
 Although escheat actions stopped in cases involving lands 
owned by U.S. citizens, noncitizen Japanese were still prohibited from 
owning their own land.
174
 It took a few more years before the Alien Land 
Law as applied to noncitizens was held unconstitutional.
175
  
 
 
 169. See Robinson & Robinson, supra note 30, at 39 n.50 (citing C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE 
ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–1947, at 283 (1948)).  
 170. See BOSNIAK, supra note 152, at 3 (―If citizenship is treated as the highest measure of social 
and political inclusion, can people designated as noncitizens as a matter of status be among the 
universe of the included?‖). 
 171. See id.  
 172. See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 647.  
 173. Indeed, the California Alien Land Law as applied to noncitizen Japanese was not repealed 
until several years after Oyama.  
 174. 1 CAL. GEN. LAWS, Act 261 § 1 (Deering 1944). 
 175. Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1952). 
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Indeed, Justice Murphy‘s concurrence conveyed precisely why the 
Supreme Court needed to address the equal protection rights of Fred 
Oyama‘s noncitizen father. As he pointed out, the California Alien Land 
Law was ―nothing more than an outright racial discrimination‖ that 
deserved ―constitutional condemnation.‖176 It was irrelevant to him that 
the Alien Land Law affected noncitizens. In his view, the law‘s denial of 
the right to property was ―racist in its origin, purpose or effect,‖ which 
offended the Fourteenth Amendment.
177
  
Thus, while Oyama should be heralded as an important civil rights 
story, this celebratory recognition must be tempered by the Supreme 
Court‘s failure to provide protection for noncitizens who continued to 
encounter racism in property law.
178
 Under this critical view of Oyama, 
equal protection principles would be meaningless if they only applied to 
U.S. citizens. The right of persons to equal access to property, regardless 
of citizenship status, recognizes that the right to property—right to a 
home, right to shelter—is a right of personhood.179 The result in Oyama 
thus provides a cautionary example of conditioning property rights on a 
status such as citizenship. 
B. Expanding the Narratives of Racialized Property Laws 
In addition to ushering a nuanced undertanding of citizenship‘s role in 
property law, Oyama also offers a more complete picture of the broader 
struggle for racial equality in property ownership in legal history. Property 
law has long been a site for the relegation of people of color to second-
class citizenship. Yet, to fully understand property law‘s role in the history 
of racial subordination, it is important to ensure that narratives about 
racialized experiences take into account the varied ways in which race 
operated to subjugate people of color. Examining the link between the 
denial of equal property rights and second-class citizenship through the 
lens of Oyama, for instance, reveals the neglected story of how the 
subordination of the property rights of Japanese Americans differed from 
other racialized groups.
180
 Ultimately, Oyama expands not only our 
 
 
 176. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 650 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Although the attorney general of California stopped all enforcement of the Alien Land Law 
after the Supreme Court decided Oyama, the law nonetheless prevented ineligible noncitizens to own 
property.  
 179. Radin, supra note 162, at 959. 
 180. Indeed, the intersection of property law, citizenship, and immigration law is an under-
attended area of law that ought to be explored further. 
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understanding of the development of property rights but also law‘s 
construction of race and citizenship. 
1. Struggle for Equality in Property 
History illuminates law‘s crucial role in foreclosing the right of equal 
citizenship and property to African Americans and other people of color. 
The Supreme Court demonstrated this point starkly in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford
181
 when it rejected the citizenship and property claim of Dred 
Scott, maintained his slave status and, in the same vein, recognized John 
Sandford as the citizen master with the protected property right of Mr. 
Scott.
182
 Ultimately, Congress expressly reversed Dred Scott by enacting 
the Thirteenth Amendment,
183
 which abolished slavery, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment
184
 to the U.S. Constitution, which conferred citizenship upon 
the former slaves.  
In recognition of the importance of property ownership as a citizenship 
right, Congress also enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which is 
presently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982,
185
 to ensure that all citizens of the 
United States in any state have the same right to purchase property as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.
186
 As scholars have noted, the historical 
background to this law demonstrates that it was originally intended to 
protect the citizenship rights of the newly freed slaves by ensuring their 
right to enter into a contract and purchase property like white citizens.
187
 
 
 
 181. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 182. Id. at 426, 452–54. 
 183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 185. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2000)). The law was subsequently reenacted in 1870 after the 
Fourteenth Amendment to further protect the civil rights of African Americans. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
(2006) (reenacting § 1978 of the Revised Statutes which codified § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866); 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1968) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
originated from the Civil Rights Act of 1866). See also Miller, supra note 30, at 1032–38 (providing a 
historical discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).  
 186. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917). The entire text of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides 
that, ―[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property.‖ 
 187. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress‘s Power To Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights: 
Lessons From Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 206–07 (2005) 
(discussing the intention of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to apply to African Americans); William M. 
Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of 
Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1367 n.210 (2007); James W. Fox, Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and 
Federalism: 1787–1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 495 (1999); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 1, 11–14 (1995).  
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The Supreme Court underscored this historical intent when it decided 
Buchanan v. Warley.
188
 Relying on the concept of equal citizenship, the 
Court invalidated public residential segregation laws to affirm the rights of 
African Americans to have the same access to property as white 
citizens.
189
 By aiming to remove the use of race in the public regulation of 
property law, the Court‘s opinion in Buchanan constituted a significant 
victory for equal access to property ownership and, by extension, equal 
citizenship.  
As history made evident, Buchanan did not necessarily lead to the full 
attainment of equal citizenship in property ownership.
190
 It took several 
more years before the Supreme Court utilized Buchanan—and Oyama as 
previously discussed—to bolster the right of African Americans to 
equality in property by holding unenforceable private racial covenants in 
Shelley v. Kraemer.
191
 And, it would take another twenty years before the 
Supreme Court recognized that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applied to 
private racial discrimination in the sale of property.
192
 Indeed, that same 
year, Congress had to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1968
193
 to further 
invalidate racially discriminatory practices that continued even after the 
Supreme Court decided Shelley.
194
 Finally, today, racial disparities in 
housing indicates that racism continues to play a crucial role in denying 
African Americans and other people of color equal access to property and, 
 
 
 188. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 78–79. 
 189. Id. at 78–79 (―Colored persons are citizens of the United States and have the right to 
purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating against them solely on 
account of color.‖). 
 190. One argument that may help to explain the limits of Buchanan is through the lens of interest 
convergence. The case involved the ability of a white seller to sell his property to whoever he wanted, 
including an African American family. Id. at 69–71. Using Derrick Bell‘s interest-convergence theory, 
one could argue that the Supreme Court invalidated the racial segregation law because it affected a 
white family‘s ability to alienate property. The case has had restrained impact, however, in protecting 
the property rights of people of color. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980), for an articulation of 
interest-convergence theory.  
 191. 334 U.S. 1, 11 (1948). For a fuller discussion of Shelley, see Carol M. Rose, The Story of 
Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169 (GERALD KORNGOLD & ANDREW P. MORRISS eds., 
2004). 
 192. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413 (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 ―bars all racial discrimination, 
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid 
exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment‖); Miller, supra note 30, at 
1017–18 (discussing the majority‘s opinion in Jones). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006). 
 194. See Villazor, supra note 37, at 823 n.144; Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year ―First 
Step‖: The Fair Housing Act as an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1617, 1619–28 (2007); Jennifer C. Johnson, Race-Based Housing Importunities: The Disparate Impact 
of Realistic Group Conflict, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 97, 104 (2007). 
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by extension, equal citizenship rights.
195
 As this brief discussion of the 
racialized history of property rights development illustrated, the 
intersection of race and property law functioned to subordinate racial 
minorities and deny them equal citizenship.  
2. Immigration and Naturalization Law‘s Interjection 
Yet, an analysis of the denial of property and equal citizenship on 
account of race would be incomplete without recognizing how other forces 
subordinated the property rights of other racialized groups.
196
 In the case 
of Japanese Americans, immigration and naturalization law interjected in 
ways that impacted property rights differently from other people of color. 
Specifically, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 interacted with the 1875 
naturalization law to legally construct the scope of equality in property law 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
The first naturalization statute limited the privilege of attaining U.S. 
citizenship to ―free white person[s].‖197 After the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provided that ―[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States . . . are citizens of the United States,‖198 Congress amended 
the naturalization statute to also allow persons of African nativity or 
ancestry to apply for citizenship.
199
 Eventually, Congress extended the 
right of citizenship in 1940 to immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere,
200
 in 1943 to persons from China,
201
 and in 1946 to 
immigrants from the Philippines and India.
202
 Eventually, in 1952 
Congress formally lifted the last racial bars to naturalization when it 
passed the Immigration and Nationality Act.
203
  
 
 
 195. Roithmayr, supra note 159, at 375–76; Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 351–53 (2009) (examining ongoing racial discrimination in 
homeownership). 
 196. It should be noted, for example, how colonialism facilitated the loss of property and 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples in the United States. See Villazor, supra note 37, at 808–14. 
 197. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
 198. The Fourteenth Amendment intentionally overturned Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 
(1857), which held that the framers of the Constitution did not intend for persons of African descent to 
acquire U.S. citizenship.  
 199. The racial requirements for citizenship to the first naturalization cases that demonstrated the 
law‘s role in socially constructing race. See HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 36, at 35–53. 
 200. 54 Stat. 1140 (1940). 
 201. 57 Stat. 601 (1943). 
 202. 60 Stat. 416 (1946). 
 203. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006). But, the 1952 Act retained restrictive quotas that imposed limitations 
on a country-of-origin basis and consequently operated to restrict the number of Asian immigrants. 
These limitations were removed in 1965. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911–
12. It should be noted, however, that arguably, the Immigration and Nationality Act continues to 
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Discussions of the passage of the 1875 naturalization law, however, 
have marginalized the ways in which this fundamentally shaped the 
property rights of noncitizens. Without doubt, the enactment of the 
naturalization law theoretically opened up the right to own, lease, and 
purchase property to African Americans.
204
 Yet, at the same time, it 
legally narrowed the property rights of those persons who fell outside of 
the Black/White requirement of citizenship. California exemplifies the 
formal constriction of the right to property caused by the naturalization 
law. The original Constitution of California provided that foreigners who 
were bona fide residents of the state would enjoy the same rights to 
property as native born citizens.
205
 Section 671 of the California Civil 
Code, which was enacted a few years before that original Constitution was 
adopted, similarly provided that citizens and foreigners would have equal 
rights with respect to the acquisition of property.
206
 Yet, in 1879, after 
Congress amended the naturalization law in 1875, California passed a new 
constitution.
207
 Article 1 of the new constitution provided that only 
―[f]oreigners of the white race or of African descent, eligible to become 
citizens of the United States under the naturalization laws thereof . . . shall 
enjoy the same rights in respect to the possession, enjoyment and 
inheritance of property, as native born citizens.‖208 Conditioning property 
rights on citizenship—then open only to whites and those of African 
descent—meant that noncitizens who could not naturalize were precluded 
from enjoying the rights and privileges of property. Critically, although 
facially ―neutral,‖ California‘s law intended to deny Asian immigrants, 
particularly Chinese immigrants, the right to own land.
209
  
 
 
include a racial restriction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006) (―Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed 
to affect the right of American Indians born in Canada to pass the borders of the United States, but 
such right shall extend only to persons who possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American 
Indian race.‖); Paul Spruhan, The Canadian Indian Free Passage Right: The Last Stronghold of 
Explicit Race Restriction in United States Immigration Law, 85 N.D. L. REV. 301, 314–16 (2009) 
(contending that 8 U.S.C. § 1359 constitutes an immigration racial restriction).  
 204. By conferring citizenship on former African slaves, they were no longer considered property. 
Additionally, the law provided that they will have the right to acquire property.  
 205. See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. 1, § 20. 
 206. CAL. CIV. CODE § 671 (West 2010) (―Any person, whether a citizen or alien, may take, hold, 
and dispose of property, real or personal, within this State.‖). 
 207. The original California constitution, which was adopted in November of 1849, prior to 
California achieving statehood in 1850, was totally superseded by the current constitution adopted in 
1879. See Juan F. Perea, Buscando America: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect 
Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1429 (2004) (noting that the 1879 California Constitution replaced 
the 1849 constitution). 
 208. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 17, repealed by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 20. 
 209. See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race 
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1944–46 (2000) (discussing various anti-Chinese proposed legislation 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/2
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Although the law directly targeted Chinese, it is possible that this law 
could have been applied to Japanese who later immigrated to California 
who, similar to Chinese, experienced both public and private 
discrimination. Specifically, since Japanese were not considered ―white‖ 
for purposes of the 1875 citizenship law—as later held by the Supreme 
Court in Ozawa v. United States,
210
 it is probable that Kajiro Oyama, as a 
foreigner who was neither White nor Black, would have been deemed 
ineligible to own property under the state constitution.
211
 Apparently, the 
constitutional restriction insufficiently assured those white farmers who 
were threatened by Japanese farmers that they might lose California land 
to Japanese.
212
 Consequently, they lobbied for the passage of the Alien 
Land Law and its more vigorous enforcement after 1942.
213
 Thus, 
although the Civil Rights Act of 1866 formally enlarged the prized right of 
property to the newly freed slaves and now citizens of the United States, it 
did not expand the property rights of those aliens who fell outside of the 
binary racial requirement of citizenship.
214
 Indeed, it foreclosed those 
rights to them. 
In sum, including Oyama in the property law canon expands our 
understanding of the entangled relationship of race, citizenship, and 
property law. The Supreme Court‘s dismantling of the Alien Land Law‘s 
discriminatory impact on Japanese Americans constituted an important 
triumph in the protracted history of struggle for equality in property rights 
faced by Japanese Americans. Oyama uncovers a more complex picture of 
how property rights developed, particularly how immigration, race, and 
citizenship shaped the conception of property rights of racialized citizens.  
 
 
during the California constitutional convention).  
 210. 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922). 
 211. Cf. id. at 198 (―The appellant, in the case now under consideration, however, is clearly of a 
race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative side.‖). For 
a fuller exploration of Ozawa v. United States and its role in the racialization of Japanese, see Carbado, 
supra note 30, at 636 (stating that the ―inability of Japanese people to become citizens—their 
unnaturalizability—was not a natural fact but a legally produced reality‖ and that ―Takao Ozawa was 
not born yellow[;] [h]e became yellow—at least in part by law‖).  
 212. See Aoki, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
 213. See id. at 67–68. 
 214. See Perea, supra note 32, at 1215. Interestingly, the companion statute to Section 1982 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866—Section 1981—provided equal protection to all persons in making and 
enforcing contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (―All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.‖). By contrast, Section 1982‘s 
protection is limited to citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). 
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III. EXAMINING THE BOUNDARIES OF STATE POLICE POWERS IN 
REGULATING NONCITIZENS‘ PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The previous discussions examined how Oyama provides a more 
complex understanding of the ways in which property law, immigration, 
race, and citizenship shaped relations among persons. Scholarly and 
pedagogical discussions of these laws would thus benefit tremendously 
from further exploration of Oyama‘s doctrinal contribution to law‘s 
construction of the underlying link between property and citizenship. In 
this Part, I show that an examination of Oyama prompts an opportunity to 
go even deeper into property law by revisiting a question that the case left 
unanswered: when does a state‘s restriction on a noncitizen‘s property 
right constitute a violation of equality principles? Put differently, why 
should a state be required to treat all citizens equally, but be allowed to 
place restrictions on noncitizens‘ ability to acquire a property interest? 
These questions were raised before the Supreme Court in Oyama in order 
to seek to overturn its earlier opinions in Terrace and progeny. Although 
the Supreme Court in Oyama had the opportunity to reconsider the 
application of the Equal Protection Clauses on these laws, the majority 
chose not to do so.
215
  
As a result, the Supreme Court let stand its previous opinions 
upholding the validity of alien land laws in Washington and California
216
 
and, importantly, left unresolved the equal protection implication of state 
restrictions on land ownership by noncitizens. It also evaded the question 
of whether the Alien Land Law constituted a regulation of immigration 
law, an area of law that has long been considered to fall within the 
purview of the federal government.
217
 These questions, as Part IV makes 
clear, remained contested and are now at the center of doctrinal debates 
about when property regulation has shifted towards unlawful immigration 
regulation.
218
 Reconsidering the limits of states‘ powers in land tenure 
 
 
 215. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (explaining that it chose not to address 
the question of whether ―the Alien Land Law denies ineligible aliens the equal protection of the laws 
. . . .‖). 
 216. As discussed in Part I supra, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the alien land laws in a 
trilogy of cases. See supra note 61 (discussing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923), Porterfield 
v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923), Webb v. O‘Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923), and Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 
326 (1923)).  
 217. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Recent scholarship, however, seeks to challenge the 
view that the federal government should have exclusive authority to regulate immigration law. See 
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787; 
Rodríquez, supra note 7. 
 218. See infra Part IV. 
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matters, particularly the regulation of noncitizens‘ property rights is thus 
particularly necessary to more fully understand the legal debates about the 
validity of these contemporary state and local laws.
219
  
Accordingly, this Part considers some of the questions left unanswered 
by the Oyama Court. It tackles these questions by examining and 
comparing various alien land laws in history to explore their underlying 
reasons for conditioning the acquisition of property rights on 
citizenship.
220
 Ultimately, the Part argues that an analysis of these laws 
yields a normative theory that may help distinguish permissible from 
impermissible state property restrictions grounded on noncitizenship.  
A. State Regulation of Noncitizens‘ Property Rights  
At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that courts have long 
recognized that states have the authority to restrict the ability of 
noncitizens to own property. Rules that limit the alienability of property 
were, as they are still today, generally disfavored under the common 
law.
221
 Yet, restraints on the alienability of lands to owners who were not 
U.S. citizens were not only common practice, but were in fact deemed 
necessary steps toward integrating a noncitizen into the U.S. polity.
222
 
Inalienability property rules based on noncitizen status originated from the 
English feudal system,
223
 were subsequently adopted in the colonial and 
post-Revolutionary period,
224
 and ultimately accepted as appropriate 
property restrictions by judges up until the nineteenth century.
225
 By the 
middle of the nineteenth century, many states codified what were then 
long-recognized common law restrictions on property rights.
226
  
 
 
 219. See id. 
 220. Although there has been scholarship on various alien land laws, there has not been 
substantive examination of how general alien land laws that restricted the ability of noncitizens to own 
property differed from the anti-Japanese alien land laws of the early to mid-1900s. See Leti Volpp, 
Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 405, 427 n.112 (2005) (explaining that these laws ―have not been studied in 
relationship to one another‖). Additionally, to date, no one has sought to connect both the general alien 
land laws and California‘s Alien Land Law to contemporary restrictions on property rights of 
noncitizens. 
 221. See SINGER, supra note 31, at 10 (―It is a fundamental tenet of the property law system that 
property should be ‗alienable,‘ meaning that it should be transferable from one person to another.‖).  
 222. Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common Law: Exploring the Relative 
Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 156 (1999) (quoting Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24, 
67 (Mich. 1870)). 
 223. Id. at 157. 
 224. Id. at 159. 
 225. Id. at 159, 167. 
 226. Id. at 169–71. 
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The origins of state restrictions on foreigners‘ ability to own land may 
be traced to the feudal system, which recognized the King not only as the 
head of the state, but also the owner of all the lands in England.
227
 As ruler 
and owner of the entire kingdom, the King gave estates of land to various 
subjects, particularly lords, who in turn pledged fealty to the King and 
provided him with goods or services, such as the provision of protection 
for the empire.
228
 The exchange of allegiance to the King for land 
ownership formed the basis of restrictions on the ability of foreigners to 
own property in England.
229
 Without fealty to the King, foreigners could 
not acquire any land.
230
 This feudal based restriction was later adopted in 
the British common law, which similarly prohibited foreigners from 
owning lands by purchase or inheritance.
231
 Purchased lands were subject 
to escheat by the state, and inherited lands were considered void ab 
initio.
232
  
The early British colonists implemented the rule against a foreigner‘s 
ownership of land when they settled in North America.
233
 These rules 
proved problematic, however, as a result of acquisition of lands by non-
English residents who did not owe allegiance to the King.
234
 Ultimately, 
these dilemmas led to naturalization as a method of removing one‘s 
prescribed disability to own property and essentially correcting a defective 
title.
235
 Nevertheless, disputes over ownership of lands between British 
and non-British subjects continued and eventually led to problems that 
helped facilitate the American Revolution.
236
  
Despite their collective break from England, the American states 
continued to impose prohibitions on land ownership by foreigners. As 
Polly Price has documented, the general restriction on noncitizens‘ 
property rights pervaded the common law. Cases that were decided during 
this period illustrated the extent to which one‘s lack of citizenship affected 
the ability of a person to acquire and transfer land.
237
 Noncitizens who did 
 
 
 227. Id. at 157. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. 
 231. James R. Mason, Jr., Note, ―PSSST, Hey Buddy, Wanna Buy a Country?‖ An Economic and 
Political Policy Analysis of Federal and State Laws Governing Foreign Ownership of United States 
Real Estate, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 453, 457 (1994); Price, supra note 222, at 157. 
 232. See id. at 457; Price, supra note 222, at 160–62. 
 233. Price, supra note 222, at 153; Mason, supra note 231, at 458. 
 234. See Mason, supra note 231, at 458. 
 235. See id.  
 236. See id.  
 237. See Price, supra note 222, at 160–66. 
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not naturalize essentially had a defeasible estate during their lifetime, 
because at any point, the state could acquire the property through a 
proceeding known as ―inquest by office.‖238 Other foreigners who died 
without a will had their lands escheat to the state, even if they had heirs 
who were U.S. citizens.
239
 Even some U.S. citizen heirs of aliens who 
were devised property under a will found themselves unable to inherit the 
land.
240
 Finally, heirs of U.S. citizens who happened to be aliens were at 
times deemed to lack ―inheritable blood‖ and unable to acquire property 
left for them by their citizen relative.
241
  
Thus, in the early common law, noncitizen status constituted a bar to 
acquiring property.
242
 The lack of citizenship and inability to own land 
mutually served to reinforce one‘s nonmembership in the community.243 
Consequently, naturalization became a method by which one gained the 
right to own land.
244
  
In the nineteenth century, states subsequently codified and modified the 
common law restriction on foreigners‘ ability to own land.245 For example, 
noncitizens who swore allegiance to the State of South Carolina were 
allowed to have a form of life estate in that the state would not exercise its 
right to forfeit ownership during the foreigner‘s lifetime.246 A North 
Carolina statute enabled property owned by foreigners who failed to 
become U.S. citizens to pass to distant relatives who were U.S. citizens if 
their heirs were noncitizens, thus, ultimately keeping the property from 
going to the state.
247
  
As with the common law, the motivation behind these laws was the 
desire of states to encourage foreigners to become citizens and thus, 
become formal members of the state. Some state constitutions, for 
example, expressly conditioned one‘s ability to own land on the 
 
 
 238. See id. at 160. 
 239. Id. at 163. 
 240. See id. at 164. 
 241. See id.  
 242. Fairfax‘s Devisee v. Hunter‘s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 620 (1812) (―[I]t is now settled that a 
British subject born before, cannot, since the revolution, take lands by descent in the United States.‖).  
 243. See Price, supra note 222, at 157–60 (discussing the historical linkage between allegiance to 
the United States and landholding). 
 244. See discussion infra Part III (explaining that states required residents to become citizens 
before becoming eligible to own property).  
 245. Price, supra note 222, at 170. 
 246. See id. at 170–71 (describing a South Carolina law that allowed foreigners to keep their lands 
during their lifetime by pledging their loyalty to the state). 
 247. See id. at 171 (explaining the North Carolina law that enabled U.S. citizen relatives to inherit 
property of noncitizens). 
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foreigner‘s intent to become a citizen.248 A few western states enticed 
foreigners to settle in their states by affording them rights to property as if 
they were citizens, demonstrating that although the immigrants were 
noncitizens,
249
 they acquired property rights that arguably made them 
substantive members of the new states. Of course, as discussed in Part II, 
it must be recalled that some of these laws defined noncitizens according 
to federal naturalization law.
250
 Yet, generally speaking, at least under the 
common law and the early nineteenth century state statutes, the primary 
stated reason for limiting noncitizens‘ access to property rights was their 
failure to choose to become citizens. Critically, the lack of citizenship was 
a disability that could be overcome.  
In short, states have long enjoyed the ability to determine what rights, 
if any, noncitizens may have with respect to the acquisition of property 
within the state‘s jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court aptly stated in one of 
the early cases regarding the land rights of foreigners, restraints on 
ownership of land on noncitizens are ―nothing more than an exercise of the 
power which every state and sovereignty possesses, of regulating the 
manner and term upon which property real or personal within its dominion 
may be transmitted.‖251 Importantly, this historical tradition points to the 
scope of what local governments may do with respect to the property 
rights of noncitizens within their jurisdictions, including the potential to 
encourage a person‘s membership to the polity through property 
ownership or possession. 
B. Comparison to the California Alien Land Law 
The question of whether the California Alien Land Law and a similar 
law, Washington‘s Alien Land Law, constituted appropriate types of 
noncitizen property restrictions was brought before the Supreme Court in 
1923. As noted previously, the Supreme Court ruled in Terrace v. 
Thompson
252
 and three other cases
253
 that they did.
254
 In Terrace, 
 
 
 248. See id. at 168–69 (discussing the constitutions of North Carolina and Pennsylvania, which 
encouraged foreigners to take the oath of allegiance or intent to become a citizen prior to gaining the 
right to own real property).  
 249. See id. at 169 (discussing the 1850 constitution of Michigan which accorded equal property 
rights to citizens and noncitizens). 
 250. See supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 251. Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. 490, 493 (1850). Indeed, the California Supreme Court relied on the 
state‘s ―right to regulate the tenure and disposition of real property within its boundaries‖ when it 
upheld the constitutionality of the Alien Land Law. People v. Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d 164, 174 (Cal. 1946). 
 252. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
 253. Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O‘Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. 
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petitioners contended that the Washington Alien Land Law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because the law‘s proscription against noncitizen 
landholding ―divided [aliens] into two classes—those who may and those 
who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is 
forbidden, to own land.‖255 The Supreme Court rejected their argument, 
relying on the power of states to determine the necessary measures for the 
protection and promotion of ―safety, peace and good order of its 
people.‖256 Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized that one‘s lack of 
citizenship suggested her lack of loyalty to the state. Quoting from the 
Washington Supreme Court, the Supreme Court explained, 
It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one 
lacks an interest in, and the power to effectually work for the 
welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny 
him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries.
257
  
While emphasizing the state‘s authority to control noncitizens‘ 
property rights, the Supreme Court completely obscured in Terrace how 
the alien land laws that targeted against Japanese fundamentally differed 
from the earlier common law and nineteenth century restrictions on 
noncitizens‘ land ownership rights. Regrettably, the Oyama Court did not 
address this crucial point as well. First, unlike the California Alien Land 
Law, their earlier counterparts were intended to encourage citizenship. The 
laws served as a reminder that one could have declared her allegiance to 
the nation and become an American citizen. In other words, the earlier 
alien land laws may be viewed to have operated to integrate noncitizens 
into the American polity. 
In contrast to the intent of the earlier alien land laws to encourage 
noncitizens to become members of the polity, the California Alien Land 
 
 
Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923). 
 254. See Terrace, 263 U.S. at 217; Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 232–33; Webb, 263 U.S. at 321–23; 
Frick, 263 U.S. at 333. 
 255. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 216. Thus, the equal protection claim of the noncitizen in Terrace is 
different from the argument made in Oyama in that the latter claimed a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause on the basis of race. See Brief for Petitioners at 8, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 
633 (1948) (No. 44), 1947 WL 44264 (―The Alien Land Law is race legislation aimed directly at the 
Japanese and . . . [u]se of the term ‗aliens ineligible to citizenship‘ is merely a guise.‖).  
 256. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 217. The Court further explained that the state was merely relying on 
classifications already established by Congress and thus, the ―state properly may assume that the 
considerations . . . are substantial and reasonable.‖ Id. at 220.  
 257. Id. (quoting Terrace v. Thompson, 274 F. 841, 849 (W.D. Wash. 1921)). The Supreme Court 
also agreed with the Washington Supreme Court‘s conclusion that without the alien land law, ―it is 
within the realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership or 
possession of noncitizens.‖ Id. at 220–21 (quoting Terrace, 274 F. at 849). 
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Law functioned to expressly exclude noncitizens whom the state deemed 
racially inferior. The law worked in tandem with similarly exclusionary 
federal immigration laws to ensure that Japanese formally and functionally 
remained outsiders in the country. Thus, unlike the former laws designed 
to persuade membership to the political system, the Alien Land Law 
sought to perpetuate exclusion.
258
 
Critically, unlike the earlier alien land laws, the California Alien Land 
Law intended to discriminate on the basis of race. Justice Murphy‘s 
stinging dissent emphasized this point in his concurring opinion.
259
 He 
opined that, 
Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the proponents of the 
California law were at any time concerned with the use or 
ownership of farm land by ineligible aliens other than those of 
Japanese origin. . . . The Alien Land Law, in short, was designed to 
effectuate a purely racial discrimination, to prohibit a Japanese alien 
from owning or using agricultural land solely because he is a 
Japanese alien.
260
  
Justice Murphy, however, did not have the support of the majority of the 
Supreme Court to articulate the position that noncitizen Japanese should 
also be entitled to own property and, importantly, that the basis of the 
restriction should be not because of their race or ancestry. Accordingly, 
although Oyama radically restricted states‘ powers with respect to the 
treatment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent, it failed to delineate the 
boundaries of states‘ powers over noncitizens‘ rights and why their 
property rights should be treated differently from U.S. citizens.  
C. Towards an Integrationist Theory of Property 
Oyama‘s acquiescence of the citizen/noncitizen distinction in property 
rights points to the need to develop a framework that could explain not 
only why citizenship or some other accepted form of membership within a 
polity should be a necessary condition of property ownership, but also 
how a state may appropriately construct limitations on nonmembers‘ 
property rights. Here, this Part introduces a normative theory that arises 
 
 
 258. See Volpp, supra note 220, at 427–28 n.112.  
 259. For fuller exploration of Justice Murphy‘s strong criticism of laws in the 1940s that racially 
discriminated against Japanese including Executive Order 9066 and California‘s Alien Land Law, see 
Kennedy, supra note 136; Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment Equal 
Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243 (2000).  
 260. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 660–62 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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from the common law‘s ability to arguably integrate noncitizens into the 
polity by enticing them with land ownership vis-à-vis naturalization. This 
theory, what this Part refers to here as the ―integrationist theory of 
property,‖ might provide a way of balancing a state‘s interests in 
protecting the general safety and welfare of her residents and also 
recognize the need to include those noncitizen persons already within the 
state‘s borders as full members of their polity. 
Property law‘s integrationist approach is arguably already reflected in 
contemporary state property restrictions on noncitizens‘ ability to own and 
lease property. For example, some states prohibit ownership of land by 
noncitizens if they are not residents of the state.
261
 The principle is that 
although one is a noncitizen, she may still become a participant within the 
state by becoming a resident. Seven states have this ―resident alien‖ 
rule.
262
 Consistent with an integrationist approach, these restrictions show 
that the conditioning of property ownership based on noncitizenship 
relates to ensuring that owners of property ultimately become members of 
the state community.
263
  
Interestingly, four states—Georgia, Kentucky, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania—have ―friendly alien‖ property rules.264 In Georgia, a 
―friendly alien‖ can own land as if she were a US citizen.265 Pennsylvania 
allows a ―friendly alien‖ to purchase property, though limited to 5000 
acres.
266
 Under the Kentucky
267
 and New Jersey rules,
268
 foreigners not 
 
 
 261. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 206-9(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008), 516-33(b) (LexisNexis 2006); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.290–340 (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 (West 2002); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-1-75 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, 
§ 122 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-2A-5 (2004). 
 262. Twelve states have what I label a ―no distinction‖ rule. The laws of these states express that 
noncitizens would be treated as if they were citizens with respect to ownership of land. ALA. CODE 
§ 35-1-1 (1991) (Alabama); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-7(a) (West 2009) (Connecticut); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 25, § 306 (2009) (Delaware); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-22-2-5 (West 2002) (Indiana); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 451 (1999) (Maine); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 1 (West 2003) 
(Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.135 (West 2005) (Michigan); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
2-1 (1995) (Rhode Island); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-2-101 (West 2004) (Tennessee); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 75-2-111 (West 1993) (Utah); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.16.005 (West 2005) (Washington); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-21 (West 2005) (West Virginia).  
 263. In Iowa, Missouri, and South Dakota, foreigners must be residents in order to be eligible to 
purchase agricultural land. IOWA CODE § 91.3 (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 442.571, 442.586 (West 
2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-2A-5 (2004). In South Dakota, if a non-resident becomes a bona fide 
resident, she may own lands. § 43-2A-5. Otherwise, nonresident aliens may own no more than 160 
acres of land. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-2A-2 (2004). What constitutes a ―bona fide resident‖ is based 
on state law.  
 264. GA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-11 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.320 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West 2003); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 28 (West 2004). 
 265. GA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-11 (2000). 
 266. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 28 (West 2004). 
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only have to be residents of the state, but they must also be subjects of 
countries that are friendly to the state.
269
 Of course, these laws can prove 
to be problematic because of their potential to invite prejudiced thinking 
about what noncitizens might be considered not ―friendly‖ or, in other 
words, an ―enemy alien.‖ Yet, the underlying notion of encouraging 
residency shows the laws‘ ability to formally integrate noncitizens into the 
state even if they are not U.S. citizens.  
Notably, there are still some laws that show distrust to the noncitizen 
but these laws may arguably also aim to protect core local interests. 
Acreage limitations, for instance, seem to address these concerns. 
Limitations on how much land a noncitizen may purchase show the state‘s 
willingness to allow them to invest in the state, but similarly protect U.S. 
citizens and other residents‘ interests in their land.270 Thus, acreage 
limitations are at times combined with types of lands, as in Nevada where 
only U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents may own 160 acres or 
more of public land or South Dakota where nonresident aliens are limited 
to 160 acres of agricultural land.
271
 
Indeed, state restrictions on property ownership based on citizenship 
may ultimately be removed and instead impose limitations on land use. 
Many state laws currently express that one‘s alien status is no longer a bar 
to inheriting property within the state.
272
 Still, some states impose land use 
 
 
 267. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.320 (LexisNexis 2002). Note also that in Kentucky, one must 
become a United States citizen in eight years or the property escheats. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 381.300 (LexisNexis 2002). 
 268. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West 2003). 
 269. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.320 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:3-18 (West 2003). 
Thus, today resident foreigners from Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea would arguably be unable to 
own land in Kentucky and New Jersey. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10.1-02 (1999). 
 270. Acreage limitations from as little as five acres in Missouri to as big as 500,000 acres in South 
Carolina aim to ensure that land in these states owned by foreigners are circumscribed. See MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 442.560, 442.566(1) (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-13-30 (2007).  
 271. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.120 (West 2000); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-2A-2 
(2004). Other acreage limitations include Arizona and Louisiana laws, which provide that noncitizens 
may own only up to 640 acres of land, a Pennsylvania law, which limits noncitizens‘ ownership of 
land to 5000 acres provided that such noncitizens must be an ―alien . . . not . . . at war‖ with the United 
States, and a California law, which proscribes foreigners from owning more than 150,000 acres of land 
unless it is used for agricultural educational purposes. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-240(A) (2003); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:1216 (2006); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 28 (West 2004); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 
§ 8105 (West 2001). 
 272. ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.111 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 25 §§ 306–08 (2009); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 732.1101 (West 2004) (but may be subject to regulation?—still good law as of now); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-112 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-111 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 89-2-23 (2008) (must be citizen of either Syria or Lebanon); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-405 (2003) (all 
such acquired land must be sold within five years of receipt); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-12 (West 2003); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-111 (2009); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 64-3 (West 2008) (unless no reciprocity); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 22 (West 2004), 20 PA. 
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restrictions such as mining and timber constraints
273
 or even owning 
property that may be used as an airport.
274
 And still, others have retained a 
possibility of regulation where a noncitizen‘s property rights may 
ultimately be made subject to state regulation.
275
 Finally, some states 
restrict noncitizens‘ property rights in the form of disclosure, registration, 
and reporting requirements.
276
 
In brief, Oyama left untouched an important part of state regulatory 
powers. Here, the proposed modest normative approach that promotes 
integration of noncitizens and contemplates the needs of local residents 
may provide one way of establishing a limit on the authority of states to 
regulate noncitizens‘ property rights. So long as states do not utilize an 
impermissible factor such as race in determining property rights, as 
California did in its Alien Land Law, states may arguably continue to 
restrict noncitizens‘ access to property within their borders. At least one 
challenge to this approach, as the next Part considers, is how to address 
circumstances when seemingly ―nonracial‖ factors, such as unauthorized 
immigration status, are in practical terms functioning to discriminate on 
the basis of race.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE AND LOCAL ―ANTI-
ILLEGAL‖ IMMIGRANT LAWS 
Thus far, the previous sections explored Oyama‘s contributions to our 
understanding of the relationships among race, citizenship, and property. 
Part II illustrated how Oyama expands our knowledge of racism‘s harmful 
effects on the property rights of Japanese Americans. Part III further 
explained the ways in which states may condition property rights based on 
 
 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2104(8), 2518 (West 2004); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41 (Vernon 2000); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 64.1-4 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.16.005 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-1-21 (LexisNexis 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-105 (2009) (but must be reciprocal). 
 273. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190 (2007) (noncitizens are prohibited from mining in Alaska unless 
reciprocal laws in foreign country); MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-3-305 (2009) (noncitizens are prohibited 
from mining coal in Montana unless reciprocal laws in foreign country); N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 81 
(McKinney 1993) (only U.S. citizens can apply to mine in New York); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 
§ 23.77(2) (Vernon 2008) (noncitizens prohibited from timber production in Texas); see OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 517.010 (West 2003) (noncitizens are prohibited from mining in Oregon). 
 274. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-3-20.1 (1995). 
 275. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; KAN. CONST. bill of rights, § 17; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 84; NEB. 
CONST. art. I, § 25; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (guaranteeing rights to only resident aliens). 
 276. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 (West 2001) (must report within ninety days); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 9I.8 (West 2008) (must file by March 31 of every year); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.254 
(West 1994) (must register within thirty days if nonresident owns more than three acres); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 710.02(4),(7) (West 2001) (reporting required if files with the federal government). 
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noncitizenship as long as such restrictions do not racially discriminate. 
Overall, the foregoing analyses employed Oyama to reconstruct our 
historical comprehension of property rights as they related to citizenship 
and race.  
This final Part shifts the conversation to current legal issues and 
considers Oyama‘s contemporary implications on local housing 
restrictions designed to exclude unauthorized immigrants. As noted in the 
Introduction, in the last few years, various towns and states have enacted 
laws that illustrate how immigration, race, and property law are once again 
converging. By threatening landlords with penalties, fines, and loss of 
lease license, these ordinances aim to deter undocumented immigrants 
from residing within their borders.  
Using Oyama as a frame of reference, this Part examines these local 
ordinances and considers how Oyama sheds new light on ways of thinking 
about these laws. In particular, this Part highlights normative and 
prescriptive approaches that may be explored in future challenges to these 
laws. Part IV.A conducts a comparative analysis of local housing 
restrictions against undocumented immigrants and California‘s Alien Land 
Law and reveals the striking parallels between them. Situated against 
current frustration with illegal immigration, these modern limitations on 
undocumented immigrants‘ lease rights facially seek to enforce 
immigration law. Closer examination of these laws, however, reveals their 
racialized intent to exclude Latina/os, regardless of immigration status, 
from particular jurisdictions. Thus, as Part IV.B more fully explains, 
similar to the alien land laws, these contemporary housing restrictions also 
implicate the property rights of U.S. citizens, including U.S. citizen 
children. Accordingly, Part IV.B considers the ways in which Oyama‘s 
legacy of protecting the rights of citizens may help counteract 
contemporary local housing restrictions against undocumented tenants.  
A. ―Illegal‖ Immigrant Relief Acts—The New Alien Land Laws 
Currently, an estimated eleven million undocumented immigrants live 
in the United States.
277
 Despite calls for legislation that will not only 
 
 
 277. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/ 
61.pdf (reporting that the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States is approximately 
11.1 million); Michael Hoefer et al., Dep‘t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unauthorized 
Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2006, at 1 (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill_pe_2006.pdf (―[t]here were an estimated 
11.6 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as of January 2006.‖). It should be 
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determine the status of undocumented immigrants but also discourage the 
migration of new unauthorized noncitizens through stricter border 
protection, Congress has failed to pass comprehensive immigration 
reform.
278 Frustrated by Congress‘s legislative inaction, several cities 
enacted laws that sought to limit the influx of undocumented immigrants 
to their municipalities. In 2006 alone, states and local governments 
adopted more than 550 state laws and eighty local ordinances in an ad hoc 
attempt to limit illegal immigration.
279
 Initiated by San Bernardino, 
California and popularized by Hazleton, Pennsylvania,
280
 some of these 
ordinances have been entitled ―Illegal Immigrant Relief Acts‖ (IIRAs). 
Expressly promulgated to discourage undocumented immigrants from 
residing in the towns that enacted them, at least some IIRAs also sought to 
prevent the ability of undocumented immigrants to gain employment 
within the towns.
281
 At large, these IIRAs and other local housing 
restrictions are part of a larger trend today of government actors limiting 
individual property rights in order to enforce immigration law. More 
narrowly, these laws demonstrate the contemporary intersection of 
property and immigration law. 
 
 
noted that the number of unauthorized immigrants may be lower than currently estimated because 
there are unauthorized immigrants who have been included in these estimates even though they have 
claims to legal status. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES: A 
CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION 1–8 (2005), http://www.migrationpolicy. 
org/pubs/MPI_PB_6.05.pdf (arguing for estimates of unauthorized immigrants to take into account 
those immigrants with claims to legal status such as those spouses and children of legal permanent 
residents).  
 278. Robert Pear & Carl Hulse, Immigrant Bill Dies in Senate; Defeat for Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2007, at A1 (reporting that proposed federal legislation that ―called for the biggest changes to 
immigration law in more than 20 years, offering legal status to millions of illegal immigrants while 
trying to secure borders‖ failed to ―move toward final passage.‖). 
 279. Dianne Solis, Cities, States Tackle Illegal Immigration on Their Own: Conflicting Laws and 
a Bitter Divide Emerge, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 26, 2006, at 1A. 
 280. For additional information about the Hazleton, Pennsylvania ordinance, see McKanders, 
supra note 12. 
 281. See infra Part IV.A. Interestingly, many of these laws have been passed in small towns that 
have experienced an increased population of Latino residents. For example, in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, 
the total population decreased from 24,730 in 1990 to 23,329 in 2000, but the Latino/Hispanic 
population grew from 249 to 1132 in that same time frame (an increase from one percent to nearly five 
percent of the total population). Other examples include Farmers Branch, Texas, which had an increase 
in the Latino population from 4895 to 10,241 between 1990 and 2000 (going from twenty percent to 
over thirty-seven percent), Riverside, New Jersey where the total population grew by only seventeen 
people between 1990 and 2000 while the Latino population grew by 114 people, Avon Park, Florida, 
which saw its Latino population nearly triple in that decade rising from 6.9% to 18.7%, Escondido, 
California where the Latino population more than doubled from 25,380 (1990) to 51,693 (2000) and 
Valley Park, Missouri, which also nearly doubled its Latino population in that decade. See BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS REPORT (1990); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS REPORT (2000). 
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Notably, closer examination of these local housing ordinances 
illustrates their striking similarities to the anti-Japanese alien land laws. 
First, local towns, and increasingly, state governments, are using a 
―neutral‖ immigration language as the basis for denying property rights.282 
Second, legislative history and surrounding circumstances demonstrate 
that the IIRAs target a racial group, in this case, mainly Latino 
immigrants.
283
  
1. ―Neutral‖ Language 
Similar to the alien land laws, IIRAs employ an immigration-related 
category to restrict noncitizens‘ property rights. Specifically, IIRAs use 
terms such as ―citizenship or eligible immigration status,‖284 ―either a U.S. 
citizen or an alien lawfully present‖285 and ―illegal alien[s]‖286 to deny a 
noncitizen who lacks valid immigration status the ability to rent 
property.
287
 Although these terms appear neutral, they are analogous to the 
―impartial‖ label ―ineligible to citizenship‖ of the California Alien Land 
Law.  
An examination of two related ordinances passed in the City of 
Farmers Branch, Texas—Ordinance 2903288 and Ordinance 2952289—
illustrates the ways in which municipalities today have utilized property 
 
 
 282. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 283. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 284. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2903, § 3(B)(1) (May 22, 2007). 
 285. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40, § 7 (Dec. 13, 2006); see also Farmers Banch, Tex., 
Ordinance No. 2952 § 1(B)(5) (Jan. 22, 2008). 
 286. Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-16, § 5 (July 27, 2006) (prohibiting renting property to 
―illegal alien[s]‖); Escondido, Cal., Ordinance No. 2006-38 R, § 16E-1 (Oct. 10, 2006) (proscribing 
―harboring [of] illegal aliens‖); County of Cherokee, Ga., Ordinance No. 2006-003, § 18-503 (Dec. 5, 
2006) (same).  
 287. The use of citizenship or legal status in obtaining a leasehold is not new. The U.S. 
Department of Housing Urban Development (HUD) requires evidence of citizenship or immigration 
status to qualify for HUD‘s Section 8 housing program, which provides for ―a uniform and non-
discriminatory certification process for citizenship and immigration status.‖ See Farmers Branch, Tex., 
Ordinance No. 2903, § 1 (May 22, 2007) (referencing 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.001–5.504 (2008), which outline 
the general HUD provisions including the requirement of citizenship or legal immigration status for 
assistance). It should be emphasized, however, that Ordinance No. 2903 was broader in scope because 
it applied to rental agreements in the private apartment market.  
 288. Ordinance 2903 repealed two earlier versions, Ordinances 2892 and 2900. See Villas at 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 861–62 (N.D. Tex. 2008) 
(explaining that Ordinance 2903 replaced Ordinances 2892 and 2900). The city council repealed the 
earlier ordinances because a ―state court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining 
implementation of Ordinance 2892 . . . finding that [it] ‗may have been approved and adopted in 
violation of the Texas Open Meetings Act.‘‖ Id. at 861.  
 289. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952, § 1(B)(5) (Jan. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/files/Ordinance%20No%202952.pdf. 
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law in tandem with federal immigration law to restrict the property rights 
of undocumented immigrants. Although they differ in some ways, they 
both demonstrate the intent of denying undocumented immigrants the 
ability to reside within the city.
290
 
The Farmers Branch City Council adopted Ordinance 2903 on January 
22, 2007
291
 and, in a local election held on May 12, 2007, nearly seventy 
percent of Farmers Branch voters approved the ordinance.
292
 Ordinance 
2903 solely targeted rental lease agreements.
293
 Under the ordinance, the 
owner or property manager must obtain evidence of citizenship or eligible 
immigration status prior to entering into any new leases or rental renewals 
from each tenant family.
294
 Indeed, the law required each resident—except 
for family members who are minor children or sixty-two years of age or 
older—to submit such evidence.295 United States citizens or nationals may 
submit a signed declaration of U.S. citizenship or U.S. nationality along 
with the presentation of a U.S. passport ―or other appropriate 
documentation in a form designated‖ by the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Department (―ICE‖).296 ―Non-citizens‖ (defined as persons 
who are neither a citizen nor a national) must sign a declaration of eligible 
immigration status,
297
 ―[a] form designated by ICE as acceptable evidence 
of immigration status,‖298 and ―[a] signed verification consent form.‖299 
The owner or property manager would then have to review the original 
forms to verify U.S. citizenship or immigration status and retain 
photocopies for at least two years after the end of the lease.
300
 Any 
 
 
 290. See id. at pmbl. (―WHEREAS, aliens not lawfully present in the United States, as determined 
by federal law, do not meet such conditions as a matter of law when present in the City of Farmers 
Branch . . . .‖). 
 291. See Villas at Parkside, 577 F. Supp. at 861 (stating that the Farmers Branch City Council 
repealed Ordinance 2892 and adopted Ordinance 2903). Around that same time, Farmers Branch also 
passed Resolution No. 2006-130, entitled ―Resolution Declaring English as the Official Language of 
the City of Farmers Branch.‖ To date, twenty-seven states have passed laws declaring English to be 
the official language. Howard Witt, English-only Movement Worries Latino, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Oct. 15, 2006. 
 292. The ordinance provided for an election that would enable the voters of Farmers Branch to 
approve or reject the law. See Villas at Parkside, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 861. On May 12, 2007, the results 
of the election showed that 4058 of the voters voted in favor of the law and 1941 voted against it. Id. 
See also Stephanie Sandoval, Immigrant Proposal Wins Easily, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 13, 
2007, at 1A.  
 293. See Villas at Parkside, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 861. 
 294. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2903, §§ 2, 4(i) (May 22, 2007).  
 295. Id. § 3(B)(3). 
 296. Id. § 3(B)(3)(i).  
 297. Id. § 3(B)(3)(ii)(a). 
 298. Id. § 3(B)(3)(ii)(b). 
 299. Id. § 3(B)(3)(ii)(c).  
 300. Id. § 3(B)(4)(i).  
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violation of the law would constitute a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum 
penalty of $500 for each day ―on which a violation occurs or continues.‖301  
Ordinance 2952 emerged in the wake of Ordinance 2903 while the 
latter was embroiled in litigation.
302
 While waiting for a court to decide the 
constitutionality of Ordinance 2903, Farmers Branch decided to pass 
Ordinance 2952. Similar to its earlier counterpart, Ordinance 2952 aimed 
to limit the ability of undocumented immigrants to live in Farmers Branch. 
It differed, however, in at least two respects. First, the city sought to create 
a residential occupancy license that all persons age eighteen or older 
would need to obtain prior to ―occupying any leased or rented single-
family residence‖303 or ―any leased or rented apartment.‖304 The ordinance 
proscribed landlords from renting their homes or apartments to persons 
who did not have a residential occupancy license.
305
 Charging a fee of five 
dollars for the issuance of the license, the city mandated all occupants to 
submit to a building inspector an application that included a signed 
declaration of one‘s U.S. citizenship or nationality. A person who was not 
a U.S. citizen or national had to provide to a building inspector an 
―identification number assigned by the federal government that the 
occupant believes establishes his or her lawful presence in the United 
States.‖306 A person, however, could still obtain a license after declaring 
that she did not know of any federally-issued identification number.
307
  
Second, Ordinance 2952 differed from Ordinance 2903 by placing the 
obligation on the city and not private landlords the obligation of verifying 
a tenant‘s authorized immigration status.308 That is, the ordinance requires 
the building inspector, a local employee, to contact the federal government 
to determine her lawful presence by submitting the occupant‘s identity and 
other information.
309
 Establishing procedures that the building inspector 
must follow concerning the verification process, Ordinance 2952 
ultimately mandates revocation of the residential occupancy license to 
both occupant and landlord or lessor if the federal government reports that 
the occupant lacks lawful presence.
310
   
 
 
 301. Id. § 6. 
 302. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 303. Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952, § 1(B)(1). 
 304. Id. § 3(B)(1). 
 305. Id. § 1(C)(4); see also id. § 3(C)(4). 
 306. Id. § 1(B)(5); see also id. § 3(B)(5). 
 307. Id. § 1(B)(5); see also id. § 3(B)(5). 
 308. Id. § 1(D); see also id. § 3(D). 
 309. Id. § 1(D)(1). 
 310. Id. § 1(D)(4). 
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As the foregoing discussion made clear, both Ordinance 2903 and 2952 
condition one‘s ability to rent property on proof of valid immigration 
status. Notably, by limiting a noncitizen‘s access to property, both 
ordinances are analogous to the alien land laws. Admittedly, in at least two 
respects, the ordinances differ from the alien land laws both with regard to 
the nature of the property restriction as well as the type of immigration 
status at issue. The form of property restriction under both ordinances—
limiting the right to rent property—is distinct from the restriction under 
the California Alien Land Law which proscribed the right to own property. 
The difference between the type of property interest at stake—ownership 
and lease—is, of course, not an inconsiderable difference.311 The right to 
own property, particularly in the nature of fee simple absolute, is 
considered a ―bigger stick‖ within the bundle of property rights than the 
right to rent property.
312
  
Nevertheless, the ability to rent property confers an individual and her 
family with important attributes of membership in the community in the 
same way that the right to own property has historically provided a person 
with membership rights.
313
 For instance, and perhaps most important 
today, the right to reside in a community either vis-à-vis home ownership 
or renting someone else‘s property enables one‘s child to acquire a public 
education. Indeed, as Goodwin Liu has argued, the right to equal 
educational opportunity is linked to notions of membership in a 
community.
314
  
Moreover, the California Alien Land Law‘s ―ineligible to citizenship‖ 
provision is recognizably distinguishable from the restriction based on 
―immigration status‖ under Ordinances 2903 and 2952. The first, of 
course, focuses on a noncitizen‘s inability to become a formal member of 
the country. The latter refers to a noncitizen who is considered here 
without proof of valid status because she either entered the country 
without authorization or overstayed her authorized visitation. Unlike the 
noncitizen ineligible for citizenship, the undocumented immigrant is not 
 
 
 311. Indeed, home ownership is ―held in high cultural esteem, as American as apple pie and 
baseball.‖ D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 255 (2006). 
 312. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1473 (1996) (calling fee simple absolute ownership ―capacious‖ 
and best ―captures the concept of property rights that are contextually defined‖). Cf. Des Moines City 
Ry. Co. v. City of Des Moines, 159 N.W. 450, 453 (Iowa 1916) (―An estate which may last forever is 
a fee. If it may end on the happening of a merely possible event, it is a determinable or qualified fee.‖).  
 313. See supra Part III. 
 314. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 344–48 
(2006). 
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authorized to remain in the country and consequently has limited claim to 
remain in the country.  
Despite these acknowledged differences, the intersection between 
immigration law and property law is evident. Both Ordinance 2903 and 
Ordinance 2952, like the California Alien Land Law, utilize an 
immigration-related category to limit a noncitizen‘s property right. Similar 
to California, the City of Farmers Branch invoked its police powers to pass 
the law.
315
 Claiming local authority over the regulation of property law, 
Farmers Branch argued that ultimately, the housing restrictions fell within 
the traditionally held powers of the city to protect the safety and welfare of 
its citizens.
316
 Critically, this position articulates the earlier arguments of 
California and Washington regarding their authority to restrict 
noncitizens‘ rights to own property that the Supreme Court upheld in 
Terrace and did not revisit in Oyama.  
2. Legislative History Demonstrates Racial Bias 
The Farmers Branch ordinances are also comparable to California‘s 
Alien Land Law upon further examination of their legislative history and 
intended effect to exclude racialized noncitizens. Because Ordinance 2903 
is the precursor to Ordinance 2952, they share the same legislative origin. 
In passing Ordinance 2903, the Farmers Branch City Council expressed 
that ―in response to the widespread concern of future terrorist attacks 
following the events of September 11, 2001, landlords and property 
managers throughout the country have been developing new security 
procedures to protect their buildings and residents.‖317 Consequently, it 
concluded that a necessity existed to ―adopt citizenship and immigration 
certification requirements for apartment complexes to safeguard the 
public‖318 and ―to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare of 
the citizens of the [City of Farmers Branch].‖319  
Yet, closer analysis of both Ordinance 2903 and Ordinance 2952‘s 
common legislative history reveals evidence of animus against 
undocumented immigrants, specifically Latino immigrants. In this way, 
Ordinance 2903 is analogous to the California Alien Land Law‘s goal of 
 
 
 315. See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2952 (Jan. 22, 2008) (―[T]he City of Farmers 
Branch is authorized to adopt ordinances pursuant to its police power to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens . . . .‖). 
 316. See id. 
 317. Farmer‘s Branch, Tex., Ordinance No. 2903 (May 22, 2007). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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excluding Japanese Americans from California. Farmers Branch City 
Council member Tim O‘Hare, the sponsor of the original bill,320 summed 
up the general consensus: Farmers Branch will be ―better off without 
illegal immigrants because they have caused an increase in crime, lowered 
property values and lowered standards in local schools.‖321 Mr. O‘Hare 
claimed that real estate agents and teachers have told him in private that 
undocumented immigrants have hurt the city.
322
  
Additional statements from Mr. O‘Hare illustrate that by 
―undocumented immigrants,‖ he meant Latinos. He stated in particular, for 
example, that the city‘s commercial center ―just kept filling up with 
Spanish-speaking businesses and restaurants . . . You don‘t need seven or 
eight Mexican restaurants in one center. . . . If you have 10 restaurants 
three blocks from your house, do you want all of them to be Italian?‖323 
Other supporters of Ordinance 2903 indicated their concern about 
declining quality in public schools due to undocumented immigrants, 
particularly those with limited English proficiency.
324
 Indeed, the student 
population increased by twenty-two percent in the past ten years, and the 
amount of limited English-speaking students doubled from twelve percent 
to twenty-four percent.
325
 Finally, some residents have expressed concerns 
about undocumented immigrants showing ―a general lack of respect‖ and 
―are part of drug and gang problems.‖326  
Those who supported restrictions on housing for undocumented 
immigrants shared similar sentiments when the Farmers Branch City 
Council enacted Ordinance 2952. In helping to unanimously pass the 
ordinance, Council member David Koch explained that the city was 
 
 
 320. Mr. O‘Hare is now the mayor of Farmers Branch. See Brandon Formby & Ian McCann, Tim 
O‘Hare Wins Farmers Branch Mayor‘s Race, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/politics/local/stories/051108dnmetimmigmayors.
e9ebdfc7.html. 
 321. Thomas Korosec, Backers Hope Laws Reverse Suburb‘s Decline, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 
Nov. 19, 2006, at A15 (reporting on a previous interview with Tim O‘Hare). 
 322. Patrick McGee, Public Opinion Doesn‘t Follow the Numbers, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Feb. 5, 2007, at 11A. O‘Hare claims to dispute the negative effect of illegal aliens is ―just 
plain ignorant.‖ See id. 
 323. Patrick McGee, Texas City Divided over Illegal Immigration, CHARLESTON GAZETTE AND 
DAILY MAIL, Jan. 27, 2007, at 1C. Mr. O‘Hare adds, ―you look at who‘s in the school, and you can 
figure it out pretty quick . . . [t]here‘s no question Farmers Branch has a lot of illegal immigrants 
here.‖ Id. 
 324. McGee, supra note 322, at 11A. ―A lot of times, the teachers are focusing on the students 
who don‘t speak English very well,‖ said Farmers Branch resident Rick Johnson. Id. Tom Bohmier 
pointed to the soaring student population due to the over-packing of illegal immigrants into 
apartments. See id. 
 325. See id. 
 326. McGee, supra note 323, at 1C. 
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―willing to stop the insanity . . . of doing nothing, the insanity of turning a 
blind eye towards illegal immigration and impact.‖327 Another Council 
member, Jim Smith, expressed the desire to also ban employers from 
hiring undocumented workers.
328
  
Collectively, these statements illuminate animus toward unauthorized 
immigrants in ways reminiscent of the sentiments expressed during the 
enactment of California‘s Alien Land Law.329 The animosity against 
Latinos becomes even more prominent when one examines the local 
interests that the ordinance is asserted to protect. The rise of unauthorized 
immigrants in Farmers Branch, for example, has been blamed for 
declining property values, increased crimes and lower educational system. 
Yet, studies have shown that, in fact, property values have gone up, crimes 
have decreased and the educational system has improved in Farmers 
Branch.
330
  
B. Oyama‘s Legacy 
The unmistakable similarities between the California Alien Land Law 
and IIRAs call for an examination of how Oyama contributes to 
contemporary analysis of these laws. Ultimately, as this Part contends, 
Oyama serves to remind us of how apparently ―neutral‖ laws designed to 
restrict noncitizens property rights may easily curb the rights and 
privileges of citizens on the basis of race or national origin. Thus, through 
the lens of citizenship, Oyama offers a warning signal of the ease with 
which local housing laws may easily slip from denying housing to 
undocumented immigrants to also excluding Americans.  
Contemporary litigation and doctrinal framing of the underlying legal 
issues surrounding the IIRAs have focused primarily on how these local 
laws violate the preemption doctrine.
331
 Strategically, relying on the 
 
 
 327. See Stephanie Sandoval, Farms Branch Bans Illegal Immigrants from Renting Houses, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/ 
dn/latestnews/stories/012308dnmetfbrentals.2c1fcca.html (critiquing the city for not adequately 
addressing illegal immigration). 
 328. See id. (proposing the imposition of penalties to employers who continue to hire 
undocumented workers). 
 329. They are also similar to expressions of anti-Latino hatred by California voters in the early 
1990s when Proposition 187 was being debated. See Johnson, supra note 57, at 1285–91. 
 330. McGee, supra note 322, at 11A. 
 331. See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865–76 
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (conducting a preemption analysis of Farmers Branch IIRA); Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517–33 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (providing a preemption analysis of Hazleton 
IIRA). For the most part, this approach has been effective because courts have generally accepted the 
argument that the local governments that have passed the IIRAs are in fact preempted by Congress‘s 
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preemption doctrine is preferable because of the difficulty of proving 
discrimination claims.
332
 Moreover, the application of the preemption 
doctrine, as previously discussed, has successfully led to the invalidation 
of some state and local laws that target unauthorized noncitizens.
333
  
Yet, the struggle between federal and state/local control over 
immigration is far from settled and suggests the need to continue to 
examine equal protection law‘s ability to address the validity of IIRAs and 
other local housing restrictions against undocumented immigrants. Indeed, 
recent federal appellate court decisions reflect a conflict in the courts 
about the preemption doctrine and the scope of immigration regulation.
334
 
Consequently, opponents of the IIRAs will need to continue considering 
other avenues for challenging their constitutionality.
335
 Oyama offers 
possibilities for considering how citizenship and equality norms may be 
utilized to invalidate these contemporary racial barriers to equal property 
rights.  
1. Preemption Doctrine  
The preemption doctrine, rooted in the Supremacy Clause,
336
 
establishes the power of Congress to preempt state and local laws, 
specifically those that are expressly preempted by federal law or those that 
are by implication interfere with or conflict with federal law.
337
 
 
 
plenary power over immigration. See Villas at Parkside, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 876; Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 
2d at 517–34. 
 332. See Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 
1844 (2008) (explaining the difficulties of proving discrimination claims in both race and sex 
discrimination cases). 
 333. See supra Part IV. 
 334. Compare Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that Oklahoma state law that enacted sanctions on employers who employed unauthorized 
noncitizens was preempted), with Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (stating that Arizona‘s law that enabled the state to revoke business licenses was not 
preempted by federal law). 
 335. A few scholars have already explored the validity of IIRAs in contexts other than the 
preemption doctrine. See, e.g., Oliveri, supra note 12 (considering IIRAs under the Fair Housing Act); 
L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting the Freedom of Undocumented Immigrants as Violations 
of Equal Protection and Principles of Federal Preemption, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 479 (2008) (analyzing 
IIRAs under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kristina M. Campbell, Local 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1041 (2007) (examining IIRAs under various laws including the First Amendment, Fair Housing 
Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
 336. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (―This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .‖). 
 337. See Crosby v. Nat‘l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (―A fundamental 
principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.‖). 
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Accordingly, courts have employed the preemption doctrine to invalidate 
state and local laws that seek to regulate immigration law and implicate 
Congress‘s sole authority to control immigration.338 In the seminal case, 
De Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court recognized that only Congress may 
expressly determine ―who should or should not be admitted into the 
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.‖339 To 
determine whether a state or local law is preempted by Congress‘s power 
to regulate immigration law, De Canas established three tests to determine 
a law‘s validity: whether a law constitutes an impermissible regulation of 
immigration law, whether a law is occupying a field over which Congress 
expressly intended to govern, and whether the law serves as an obstacle to 
accomplishing Congress‘s goals.340  
Although these particular preemption doctrinal tests developed many 
years after the Supreme Court decided Oyama, the Court did have 
occasion to address the federalism tension between state property law and 
federal immigration law in the decades before Oyama.
341
 In particular, in 
the series of 1923 Supreme Court cases that upheld the validity of the alien 
land laws of Washington and California, the Court recognized that the 
laws were passed under the traditional power of the states to regulate 
property law.  
Indeed, the conflict arose a few months after Oyama in Takahashi v. 
Fish and Game Commission.
342
 Typically invoked to support the exclusive 
congressional power in immigration law,
343
 Takahashi in fact clarified the 
appropriate boundary between state property law and federal immigration 
law. In this case, the Court examined whether a California law that 
prohibited the issuance of a fishing license to a person ineligible for 
citizenship constituted a violation of his equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
344
 The Court invalidated the law, holding that the 
law conflicted with the power of Congress to regulate immigration law.
345
  
 
 
 338. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 339. Id. at 355. 
 340. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 341. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923). 
 342. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).  
 343. See, e.g., Complaint, Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
858 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Nos. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 3:06-CV-2376-L, 3:07-CV-0061-L); Complaint, Villas 
at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:08-CV-1551-B, 3:03-CV-1615, 2010 WL 
1141398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010). 
 344. See Takahashi, 334 U.S. 410. 
 345. Id. at 419 (stating that ―[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance 
or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived 
federal power to regulate immigration‖ law). 
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Yet, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished the restriction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the provision of fishing licenses by a state
346
 
from ―state laws barring aliens ineligible to citizenship from land 
ownership.‖347 Although it cited Oyama to hint that its earlier opinion in 
Terrace v. Thompson and subsequent cases had become questionable,
348
 
the Court nevertheless emphasized that a state‘s right to determine the 
property rights of noncitizens was ―a power long exercised and supported 
on reasons peculiar to real property.‖349 
The Supreme Court‘s recognition of the authority of states to regulate 
noncitizens‘ property acknowledged in the foregoing cases, however, have 
not been fully considered in contemporary cases analyzing the validity of 
the IIRAs. Similar to litigation of the alien land laws, the central question 
examined in lawsuits against current local housing restrictions is whether 
the laws are valid exercises of state and local government police powers. 
Ultimately, because the IIRAs directly affect the rights of immigrants, 
they have been challenged under the preemption doctrine.
350
 And, as noted 
earlier, these lawsuits have been largely effective. For instance, landlords 
and tenants who argued against the constitutionality of Ordinance 2903 
and Ordinance 2952 prevailed in their claim that the law was 
preempted.
351
 In Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch 
(Villas I), the district court held that Ordinance 2903 constituted an 
impermissible regulation of immigration law.
352
 Employing De Canas, the 
court concluded that the ordinance ―adopted federal housing regulations 
used to determine noncitizens‘ eligibility for assistance‖ which in effect 
functioned to regulate immigration law.
353
 Accordingly, the court 
permanently enjoined the ordinance.
354
  
In holding that Ordinance 2903 was preempted, the court carefully 
distinguished the law from other local ordinances that have been upheld 
 
 
 346. See id. The Supreme Court also relied on Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 
419–20.  
 347. Id. at 422 (citing Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) and progeny). 
 348. See id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865–74 
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (Villas I); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517–33 (M.D. Pa. 
2007). 
 351. Villas I, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 879 (granting permanent injunction of Farmers Branch Ordinance 
2903); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777 (N.D. Tex. 
2007) (granting preliminary injunction of Farmers Branch Ordinance 2903).  
 352. Villas I, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 869. 
 353. See id.  
 354. See id. at 879. 
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recently by other courts.
355
 In particular, the court in Arizona Contractors 
Association v. Candelaria
356
 upheld a state law that prohibited employers 
from hiring undocumented employees.
357
 In that case, the court held that 
the law was not preempted because the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, according to the court, expressly authorized the law.
358
 Similarly, in 
Gray v. City of Valley Park,
359
 the court also upheld the constitutionality 
of a law that punished employers for hiring unauthorized immigrant 
workers.
360
 Like the court in Arizona Contractors, the Gray court 
concluded that the Valley Park ordinance was consistent with the 
preemption doctrine.
361
 In distinguishing the employment-related laws 
upheld in Gray and Arizona Contractors from Ordinance 2903, the court 
in Villas at Parkside emphasized that Ordinance 2903 applied to landlords, 
not employers.
362
  
Recently, a district court struck down Ordinance 2952 and, in doing so, 
similarly invalidated the law under the preemption doctrine. In Villas at 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Villas II),
363
 the district 
court utilized the three tests under De Canas to conclude that the 
ordinance was expressly and impliedly preempted by the Congress‘s 
immigration powers.
364
 First, the court held that although the ordinance 
 
 
 355. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *31 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (affirming local law that proscribed the employment of undocumented workers); 
Ariz. Contractors Ass‘n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1061 (D. Ariz. 2008) (same). 
 356. See Ariz. Contractors Ass‘n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.  
 357. Id. at 1052. 
 358. Id. at 1045–46. 
 359. No. 4:07CV00881 ERW, 2008 WL 294294 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (regarding a law that 
suspends business licenses of employers who knowingly recruit, hire, or employ undocumented 
workers). 
 360. Id. at *31. 
 361. Id. at *19. 
 362. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 (N.D. Tex. 
2008). Additionally, the court stressed that the laws challenged in Gray and Arizona Contractors used 
a federal program established by the Department of Homeland Security, whereas Ordinance 2903 
relies on classifications promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. See id. at 
865–66. 
 363. Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, Nos. 3:08-CV-1551-B, 3:03-CV-1615, 2010 
WL 1141398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010). 
 364. See id. at *14–19. In conducting its preemption analysis, the court noted that its analysis 
turned not on the parties‘ divergent characterizations of Ordinance 2952 but rather on the ―governing 
legal standards.‖ Id. at *13 (explaining that the ―parties [had] starkly differing characterizations of the 
Ordinance‖).  
 In addressing the ways in which the parties described the purpose of Ordinance 2952, the court 
illuminated the intersection between property and immigration. The court explained: ―Plaintiffs argue 
the Ordinance is the latest in a series of attempts by the City to regulate the presence of illegal aliens; 
the City counters that the Ordinance, though touching on immigration, is instead a regulation of rental 
housing.‖ Id. at *13.  
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relies upon federal immigration classifications of noncitizens, it 
nevertheless constitutes ―invalid regulation of immigration‖ because it 
uses those classifications in ways not ―authorized or contemplated by 
federal law.‖365 Specifically, according to the court, the ordinance‘s new 
requirements imposed additional local requirements on those noncitizens 
who desired to live in Farmers Branch. Rejecting the city‘s arguments that 
the local housing restriction was akin to valid local laws that deny public 
benefits or constrain employment of undocumented noncitizens, the court 
explained that ―[r]estrictions on residence directly impact immigration in a 
way that restrictions on employment or public benefits do not.‖366 Unlike 
the context of laws regarding public benefits or employment of 
noncitizens that may be based on expressed provisions of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, Ordinance 2952 lacks such authority or source of 
congressional law.
367
 
Evidently, the preemption doctrine has been successful in halting these 
local restrictive housing laws. From a broad perspective, federalism 
concerns have taken part in confirming the prominence of federal 
regulation of immigration and its impact on local governments‘ invocation 
of their police powers to refuse noncitizens the privilege of residing in 
their jurisdictions. By holding that the federal government preempts local 
governments from imposing such restrictions not contemplated by the 
federal law, courts have employed the preemption doctrine to curb the 
continued collision between property and immigration law. 
Oyama‘s acquiescence of the citizen/noncitizen distinction in property 
ownership, however, establishes that the current preemption approach to 
these local housing ordinances is far more complex than contemporary 
legal analyses provide. That is, courts have not included in their 
consideration of the laws the long acknowledged power of states to limit 
noncitizens‘ property rights. Arguably, Oyama signals the need to 
incorporate this long history within the preemption analysis to prevent 
legal decisions that may sweep too broadly and eviscerate an important 
and historically recognized state right. The exercise of this right, when 
done appropriately in ways that integrate noncitizens, could serve a 
powerful way of complementing—not violating—the federal 
government‘s immigration regulatory powers.368 
 
 
 365. Id. at *16. 
 366. See id. 
 367. See id.  
 368. Thus, property law‘s integrationist approach contributes to current discussion of how state 
and local governments may be involved in the regulation of immigration law in ways that do not 
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Importantly, Oyama serves as a reminder that restrictive local housing 
laws do not only affect noncitizens. They also implicate the property 
interests of citizens, particularly U.S. citizen children, whose concerns 
have not been fully explored in current litigation. This final part thus aims 
to highlight one of the crucial lessons from Oyama—the need to protect 
citizen children‘s property rights.369 
2. Promoting Equal Access to Property 
Perhaps the most relevant question that emerges after understanding 
the connections between the IIRAs and the Alien Land Law is whether 
Oyama‘s prescriptions against discriminatory property barriers would be 
applicable in this context. That is, might Oyama‘s recognition of the equal 
protection rights of Japanese American children apply today to U.S. 
citizen children whose property rights are implicated by laws denying their 
undocumented immigrant parents from renting property?  
To be clear, plaintiffs involved in challenging IIRAs have contended 
that these laws violate their equal protection rights on the basis of race or 
national origin because the laws are directed against those persons of 
Latino descent. For example, in Lozano v. Hazleton,
370
 the court addressed 
the plaintiffs‘ claim that the City of Hazleton‘s local ordinance violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
371
 Illustrating 
the difficulty with which violations of equal protection principles are 
proven today,
372
 the court explained that the plaintiffs were unable to 
―demonstrate discriminatory intent in passing the amended IIRA.‖373 In 
Villas I
374
 as well as Villas II,
375
 the plaintiffs similarly raised equal 
protection violations. Neither Villas I nor Villas II, however, addressed 
 
 
undermine the federal government‘s plenary authority over immigration. Accordingly, property law‘s 
function in broader discussions of federal/state/local immigration regulation should be explored 
further. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 217, at 789; Rodríguez, supra note 7, at 569; Huyen Pham, 
The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008).  
 369. This is not to suggest that citizenship must be the fundamental basis for the conferral and 
enjoyment of rights. This Part simply points out the need to consider the effects of local housing 
restriction laws and other IIRAs on U.S. citizens. 
 370. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 371. See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (explaining that plaintiffs contended that the city 
ordinance would use ―race, ethnicity or national origin in determining whether a complaint under the 
Ordinance is ‗valid‘‖). 
 372. See Mayeri, supra note 332, at 1844. 
 373. Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 540. 
 374. 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (Villas I). 
 375. Nos. 3:08-CV-1551-B, 3:03-CV-1615, 2010 WL 1141398 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010) (Villas 
II). 
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their claims and instead focused its analysis primarily on their preemption 
argument.
376
 
The legal rejection or nonrecognition of these equality claims 
evidences an unfortunate trend. The preemption doctrine, although 
successful in invalidating these laws, fails to address the racialized 
purpose and intent of these laws that fuel anti-Latino sentiment and 
message of non-inclusion of Latinos/as in these cities.
377
 An examination 
of the Oyama opinion and the underlying history and purposes of the 
California Alien Land Law, as this Article has done, shows that indeed, 
the IIRAs are the new Alien Land Laws of our time.
378
 The legacy of 
Oyama in promoting equal access to property regardless of race or 
ancestry thus alerts us to the need to rethink law‘s elision of the varied 
ways in which the IIRAs exclude noncitizens, primarily because they are 
Latino.  
In the end, Oyama prescribes two possible doctrinal moves to correct 
the inequities that result from the IIRAs. The first is the use of 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1982 to challenge the IIRAs in much the same way as Fred Oyama 
successfully did sixty years ago.
379
 In particular, U.S. citizen children of 
undocumented immigrants could arguably use Section 1982 to contend 
that they have been deprived of their equal access to property as white 
citizens. The fact that the property interest at stake here—lease of a 
resident—and not ownership in fee simple absolute of land should not 
diminish in any way the citizen‘s right to equal treatment in property 
law.
380
 Today, as scholars and policy makers have explained, one‘s choice 
of residence directly relates to decisions about where to send her children 
to school.
381
 Thus, the ability of a U.S. citizen‘s parent to rent an 
apartment or a house in turn confers the child with the necessary residency 
 
 
 376. See Villas I, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 864–76; Villas II, 2010 WL 1141398, at *12–19.  
 377. Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 652, 659 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the ―arrival of the Japanese fanned anew the flames of anti-[Asian] prejudice‖ and that ―[t]he fires 
of racial animosity were thus rekindled and the flames rose to new heights‖). 
 378. See supra Part IV.A. 
 379. See supra Part I. 
 380. Continued racial disparities in home ownership, which cause many African Americans and 
Latinos to rent homes, signal the need to further explore the implications of racial barriers in the 
acquisition of property. See Roithmayr, supra note 159, at 383 (noting that the 2000 Census showed 
that seventy-one percent of whites owned homes but only forty-six percent of African Americans and 
Latinos were homeowners). 
 381. See Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market: The Structure of School Choice, 2008 BYU L. 
REV. 557, 563 (explaining that because parents know that their choice of residence helps to determine 
where their kids will go to school, they typically buy or rent a house in the right school district). See 
also Roithmayr, supra note 159, at 385–86 (stating that many potential home buyers pay attention to 
school and school finance systems because of their impact on property values).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1040 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:979 
 
 
 
 
requirement to attend public school. Indeed, many families strive to live in 
neighborhoods that are zoned in good school districts.
382
 Oyama‘s 
protection of the property rights of citizens might thus be applied in the 
particular context of ensuring that a U.S. citizen Latino child is given 
equal access to a home and an education in the same way that other 
citizens are.
383
 
Even more, courts could also look to Oyama, specifically the 
concurring opinion of Justice Murphy, to do something that the Supreme 
Court failed to do. Specifically, courts could consider ways of extending 
equal protection to noncitizens seeking access to property.
384
 Indeed, 
Justice Murphy‘s view of the general applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to persons and not citizens would further support providing 
protection to noncitizens who are undocumented immigrants and seek 
equal access to property. It could even be considered the logical extension 
of Plyler v. Doe, which held that the right to an education may not be 
denied to a child because of her immigration status.
385
 If the restriction on 
rental leases based on undocumented status precludes an immigrant child 
from obtaining an education, the restriction could be interpreted to run 
afoul of Plyler.
386
 In fact, in both Oyama and Plyler, the Supreme Court 
expressed the view of the unfairness of punishing children for the mistakes 
that their parents had made.
387
  
Thus, at minimum, courts could turn to Oyama as an avenue for 
invalidating the IIRAs because of the need to affirm the rights of a U.S. 
citizen to acquire a property interest through a lease. More broadly, 
Oyama encourages the extension of equal protection principles to 
noncitizens, even those who are unauthorized to be here.  
 
 
 382. See Roithmayr, supra note 159, at 385–86. 
 383. As the Supreme Court explained in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), ―education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship.‖ Id. at 222–23 (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 384. See supra Part I and accompanying notes (examining Justice Murphy‘s concurrence). 
 385. Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 at 230 (explaining that the denial of public education to undocumented 
children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 386. See id.  
 387. See id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that the undocumented immigration children 
were ―excluded only because of a status resulting from the violation by parents or guardians of our 
immigration laws‖); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 642–44 (―Fred Oyama had to counter 
evidence that his father was remiss in his duties as guardian. . . . [T]he father‘s deeds were visited on 
the son; the ward became the guarantor of his guardian‘s conduct.‖). 
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CONCLUSION 
Both historically and today, the convergence of property, immigration, 
and race had shaped the development of equal protection and conceptions 
of race and citizenship. Yet, much about the intersection of these laws 
remains undertheorized. Indeed, on a broader level, our understanding of 
race and racism continues to be limited. As U.S. Attorney General Eric 
Holder stated in a much-publicized speech over a year ago, we are a 
―nation of cowards‖ because ―we, average Americans, simply do not talk 
enough with each other about race.‖388 Whether or not one agrees with his 
statement, the controversy that it generated
389
 demonstrates starkly the 
need to examine more fully the historical and ongoing role of race in law 
and society.
390
  
One starting point for instantiating a deeper conversation about race 
and its varied relations to the law is to consider the cases that are included 
in the first year curriculum.
391
 Although such discourses are neither 
uncontroversial nor easy,
392
 they prompt opportunities to interrogate the 
historical and contemporary linkages among law, race, and other factors 
that promoted subordination.  
As this Article argued, Oyama is one such case that should be included 
in the property and constitutional canons. Oyama has much to offer our 
collective knowledge of property, equal protection, race, and citizenship 
jurisprudence. The case constitutes an important piece of the larger story 
of non-whites‘ struggle for equal access to property in the early 1900s. 
Indeed, it presents narratives of discriminatory laws that have been elided 
 
 
 388. Editorial, ‗A Nation of Cowards‘? The Attorney General‘s Speech on Race, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 21, 2009, at A12. 
 389. Helene Cooper, Attorney General Chided for Language on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, 
at A26 (reporting that President Barack Obama ―would have used different language‖ and that ―[h]is 
remarks ignited protest, particularly from conservatives‖); Stephen L. Carter, We‘re Not ‗Cowards,‘ 
We‘re Just Loud, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A27 (agreeing with Mr. Holder‘s statements); All 
Things Considered: Holder‘s Cowards‘ Comments Examined (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 20, 2009), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates.story/story.php?storyId=100939348 (―[S]ome have 
applauded Eric Holder‘s courage. Others took offense to his description of Americans as cowardly.‖).  
 390. Calls for scrutiny of the relationship between law and race are, of course, not new. Indeed, 
legal scholars who helped develop critical race theory more than twenty years ago advocated for 
deeper analysis of the link between the two. See generally CRENSHAW, supra note 32, at xiii–xxxii. 
Yet, the interconnections between race and law remain underexplored in legal scholarship. See Cheryl 
I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1234 (2002) (―[T]he ways 
in which race plays a role in legal education and legal scholarship remain insufficiently understood.‖). 
 391. See Harris, supra note 390, at 1234; Ansley, supra note 37, at 1520.  
 392. Indeed, they are to the contrary. See Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, 
Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
635, 653–55 (2008) (explaining the challenges of discussing race matters in law school classes). 
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in conventional discussion of discrimination typically framed along a 
―Black/White paradigm.‖ Specifically, Oyama uncovers how people of 
color who fell outside of this binary construction also have been racialized 
and subordinated. In the case of Japanese Americans, property law 
intersected with immigration and nationality law in ways that perpetuated 
their foreignness and second-class citizenship by denying them an 
important right of citizenship—the right to own property. Examining 
Oyama and the dismantling of barriers to property faced by Japanese, 
resident aliens, and U.S. citizens alike thus expands our overall conception 
of the link between property ownership and equal citizenship.  
Moreover, examining Oyama‘s legacy provides useful perspective to 
contemporary property restrictions today. The burgeoning state and local 
laws that limit the property rights of a select group of noncitizens, namely 
undocumented immigrants, raise contemporary questions of race, 
property, and citizenship. Ultimately, Oyama prescribes that courts should 
take a more vigilant approach in their examination of these laws by 
considering whether immigration status is being used as a proxy for race.  
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